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“A NECESSARY COST OF FREEDOM”? 
THE INCOHERENCE OF SORRELL V. IMS 
Tamara R. Piety∗ 
ABSTRACT 
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court decided an important case that 
has been largely overlooked—Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.1 In Sorrell the 
Court struck down a Vermont law prohibiting the sale for marketing 
purposes of physicians’ prescription records without their permission on 
the grounds that the law was not “content neutral.” The majority found 
that because the Vermont statute singled out marketing for special 
treatment, the law constituted a form of “viewpoint discrimination.” The 
First Amendment, Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion, requires 
us to tolerate speech we may not like as a “necessary cost of freedom.” 
This reading of “content neutrality” makes the commercial speech 
doctrine incoherent. By definition the doctrine only applies to speech which 
is “commercial”—that is, speech distinguished by its commercial content. 
After Sorrell any regulation of marketing could potentially fail the content 
neutrality test. Moreover, by casting the marketer as a “disfavored” 
speaker by virtue of regulation, Sorrell turns the rationale for the 
commercial speech doctrine upside down. The doctrine was not created to 
protect commercial speakers. It was created to carve out a limited area of 
First Amendment protection for truthful commercial speech in order to 
protect consumers’ right to receive accurate product information and to 
thereby promote the public interest in a properly functioning market. There 
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1. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
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is no indication in the case establishing the doctrine that the Supreme 
Court intended to protect merchants’ sales pitches as if they were 
viewpoints. Yet this is what Sorrell seems to provide. 
This Article argues that Sorrell’s content neutrality test is misplaced 
with respect to commercial speech because it subverts the rationale for 
protecting some commercial speech and unduly burdens the government’s 
ability to protect the public from marketing practices which undermine 
public health, safety, and welfare. The notion that unrestrained freedom for 
commercial speech is a “necessary cost of freedom” is not just wrong, it is 
dangerously wrong. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Citizens 
United2, it cast the corporation into the role of “disfavored” speaker and 
thereby signaled it was willing to contemplate an extremely muscular 
vision of corporate rights. The decision unleashed a firestorm of protest and 
commentary.3 In contrast, the Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS 
 
2. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
3. See, e.g., Brandon S. Boulter, Expensive Speech: Citizens United v. FEC and the Free Speech 
Rights, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2243 (2010); Robert B. Sobelman, An Unconstitutional Response to 
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Health,4 which similarly expanded corporate rights into an arguably even 
more dangerous area, one that strikes at the heart of the government’s 
ability to regulate commerce, has generated much less attention. 
There were no presidential denouncements of Sorrell and little of the 
sort of outraged commentary that characterized the coverage of Citizens 
United. The November 2011 issue of the Harvard Law Review does not 
even mention it as a “leading case” in the important First Amendment 
decisions from 2011.5 Yet in Sorrell the Court substantially extended the 
protection given to commercial speech under something known as the 
commercial speech doctrine. The commercial speech doctrine was created 
in 1976 in a case known as Virginia Pharmacy.6 It announced that truthful 
commercial speech enjoyed a limited degree of First Amendment 
protection; truthful speech could be regulated, but only if the government 
met certain conditions. The controlling test was articulated in 1980 in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York.7 The Central Hudson test provided a four-part test for the 
constitutionality of regulation of commercial speech: (1) speech must 
“concern lawful activity and not be misleading,” (2) the regulation must be 
motivated by a “substantial” government interest, and (3) directly advance 
that substantial interest, but (4) do so in a manner “not more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest.”8 
 
Citizens United: Mandating Shareholder Approval of Corporate Political Expenditures, 77 BROOK. L. 
REV. 341 (2011). 
4. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
5. See 125 HARV. L. REV. tbl. of contents (Nov. 2011), available at 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/november11/index.php. 
6. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The term 
“commercial speech doctrine” term can be confusing because it is sometimes used to refer to the 
announcement by the Court in a much earlier decision, Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 
(1942), that commercial speech received no protection at all under the First Amendment. See Alex 
Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 627 (1990) (“In 
1942, the Supreme Court plucked the commercial speech doctrine out of thin air. The case was 
Valentine v. Chrestensen.”) (citations omitted). But see David Vladeck, Lessons From A Story Untold: 
Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2004) (describing the Virginia 
Pharmacy opinion as the “opening chapter of the [commercial speech] doctrine”) (citations omitted). 
See also Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process 
and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979) (“Until very recently, the Supreme Court refused 
to apply the first amendment to ‘commercial speech.’”). However, after Virginia Pharmacy the phrase 
is most often used to refer to the rule announced in that case—see, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, A Brief 
History of the Commercial Speech Doctrine (With Some Implications for Tobacco Regulation), 2 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 103, 103 (2010)—and that is how I use the term here. For a more 
contemporaneous statement that Virginia Pharmacy marks the beginning of what we now know as the 
commercial speech doctrine (whether as a completely new thing or as a revision of the prior doctrine), 
see Burt Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 
437, 437-38 (1980). 
7. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
8. Id. at 566. 
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Yet ever since the doctrine was created, it has been the target of 
attacks. For the most part, these attacks have been intended not to return 
commercial speech to its prior status under which it received no First 
Amendment protection,9 but rather to eliminate commercial speech’s 
purportedly “second-class citizen” status and to offer it full First 
Amendment protection.10 Although the Court has repeatedly declined such 
invitations,11 it has, over time, interpreted the Central Hudson test more 
strictly so that some commentators have observed that what began life as 
an intermediate scrutiny test has evolved into a strict scrutiny test in all but 
name.12 With Sorrell the Supreme Court finally gave industry most of what 
it sought in earlier cases by essentially rendering the Central Hudson test 
irrelevant and engrafting a content neutrality test onto the commercial 
speech doctrine that will likely make it easier to invalidate any regulation 
of commercial speech. Sorrell may mean that henceforth, in practice, if not 
formally, commercial speech will be treated as fully protected.13 
For this reason Sorrell is likely to have far-reaching consequences. I 
very briefly sketched out some of those consequences in an earlier 
reaction14 to Citizens United,15 a decision which contained similar anti-
discrimination rhetoric and presaged the outcome in Sorrell.16 Here I 
discuss the intellectual foundations of the commercial speech doctrine, its 
history and justifications, along with the various other forces that led us to 
 
9. One of the most notable exceptions is the Jackson and Jeffries article, supra note 6. Jackson 
and Jeffries argued that Virginia Pharmacy was wrongly decided insofar as it elevated commercial 
speech to the status of protected speech under the First Amendment because they thought commercial 
speech did not implicate any of the interests the First Amendment was meant to protect. Id. at 5–6. They 
further argued, as I do here, that First Amendment protection for commercial speech threatens to 
resurrect the discredited Lochner-era substantive due process review of economic regulation. Id. at 30–
33. 
10. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 786 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to 
commercial speech rights as second class First Amendment rights). 
11. Most recently in 2003 in Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
12. Vladeck, supra note 6 at 1059. 
13. Others have argued that Sorrell has similarly troubling implications for the protection of 
privacy. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of 
Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855 (2011). For the distinction between economic and personal rights, see 
Ernest A. Young, Sorrell v. IMS Health and the End of the Constitutional Double Standard, 36 VT. L. 
REV. 903 (2011). Others have celebrated the decision as one upholding core First Amendment 
principles. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, Uncensored Discourse Is Not Just for Politics, 36 Vt. L. Rev. 845 
(2011). 
14. Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16 (2010), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/citizens-united-
and-the-threat-to-the-regulatory-state (last visited Aug. 24, 2012). 
15. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
16. See Defendant AT&T Mobility, LLC’s Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
Yeager v. AT&T Mobility, 2011 WL 3847178 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2011) (No. CIV. S–07–2517 KJM 
GGH PS), 2011 WL 3383506 at *4 (arguing that Sorrell is the case I predicted would emerge from the 
reasoning used in Citizens United). 
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the major doctrinal shift in Sorrell, a shift that transforms a fairly prosaic 
regulation of commerce into what sounds like a civil rights case.17 Yet 
treating global pharmaceutical companies as if they were embattled, under-
represented minorities risks trivializing the real life-and-death struggles of 
plaintiffs who are in fact relatively powerless and elides the Court’s 
exercise of its counter-majoritarian power on behalf of the powerful. 
Moreover, Sorrell completes what has been a decades-long process of 
turning the rationale for commercial speech doctrine upside down by 
putting the speaker, rather than the public interest, at the center of the 
analysis. It completes what I call has been a “bait-and-switch” whereby the 
protection for commercial speech was offered under one justification, but 
once it was granted, has morphed into something completely different.18 
This is something different than the normal evolution of a doctrine in the 
common law tradition. Rather, Sorrell’s reasoning eviscerates the rationale 
on which Virginia Pharmacy was based—protection of listeners’ 
interests—and substitutes for it a rationale which elevates the interests of 
commercial speakers over that of listeners, such that even where the speech 
presents a detriment to listeners, it is protected because of its value to the 
speaker. Because this reading of the First Amendment is inconsistent with 
much regulation of commerce, particularly consumer protection regulation, 
it seems unlikely the Court ever intended to establish such a principle. 
Instead listeners’ interests served as the attractive “bait” to garner a ruling 
that later served as a basis to persuade the Court to “switch” to the rationale 
offered in Sorrell. 
Sorrell is the case I predicted Citizens United might generate. It may 
have gotten comparatively less attention than Citizens United because the 
Court in Sorrell was less forthright in signaling that it was making new law 
than it was in Citizens United, but it may also be because the facts and the 
background of Sorrell seemed complicated or technical or of limited 
 
17. In some sense this is not “new” because, as will be discussed in more detail below, these 
arguments started being made almost at the outset of the creation of the commercial speech doctrine. 
But it is only since the early 1990s that the case law began reflecting some of this tone and only since 
2010 and the Citizens United case that the Court seems to be prepared to take the rhetoric to its farthest 
logical conclusion. On the use of civil rights rhetoric in the service of new and unexpected 
beneficiaries, see Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional 
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 690 (2005) (“[T]hey [new generation conservatives] too discovered 
that they could turn the liberal rhetoric of the Civil Rights Movement and the Rights Revolution to new 
purposes.”). On another exploration of the rightward shift, loosely speaking, of the use of the First 
Amendment, see Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 935 (1993). 
18. I am using the term “bait-and-switch” as a metaphor because it seems so apt. However, I do not 
think that there was an explicit plan by any person, entity or industry to foist this doctrine on the public 
through deception about its justifications, although the Powell Memorandum, see infra note 221, might 
suggest some degree of coordination. Rather, I think this was perhaps a case of unintended 
consequences. 
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interest if you were not a physician or in pharmaceutical marketing. The 
case involved Vermont’s attempt to limit the sale of physician-identified 
prescription records to data-mining companies where that information 
would ultimately be used for marketing purposes. Data mining is one of 
many tools pharmaceutical companies use to market brand-name drugs. 
Because heavier use of brand-name drugs over generics raises the cost of 
health care, Vermont wanted to regulate this practice. The Supreme Court 
held Vermont could not do so because in singling out marketing for special 
treatment it infringed on the rights of data miners and pharmaceutical 
companies to collect, sell and ultimately to use this data. 
In what follows I describe the links between the commercial speech 
doctrine and the emergence of corporate political speech, the vision of the 
corporation as a legitimate rights holder and participant in the political 
process, and why Citizens United in turn influenced the Court’s 
interpretation of the commercial speech doctrine in a way that turned that 
doctrine on its head. Part I describes the background against which the 
Vermont legislation was passed and the public health and welfare issues 
pharmaceutical marketing may raise, while Part II focuses specifically on 
Sorrell and how the Supreme Court characterized the dispute as one of 
disputed “viewpoints,” thereby fundamentally reframing the rights and 
interests protected under the commercial speech doctrine. 
Part III describes the bait in this bait-and-switch—the intellectual 
foundations for the commercial speech doctrine. Part IV describes how the 
Court took the bait and created the commercial speech doctrine. It follows 
the doctrine’s development to the present and notes how Chief Justice 
Rehnquist repeatedly (and presciently) argued that this new doctrine 
threatened government’s legitimate power to regulate commerce and how, 
from the beginning, the doctrine was plagued by definitional difficulties, 
difficulties which illustrate that the entire doctrine depends on content-
based distinctions, even if the Court has never offered clear guidance on 
what makes speech “commercial.” 
Part V describes how the “switch” to a more speaker-oriented 
protection came about, describing the scholarly work that argued that 
protection for freedom of expression necessarily entailed an equality 
principle. This argument provided the intellectual foundation for first 
extending protection to corporate participation in political speech, a 
development which then migrated back to the commercial speech context 
so that a doctrine which was justified on the basis of protection for 
consumers shifted to one which protected speakers’ interests, even where 
such speech was at the consumers’ expense or where they did not wish to 
receive it. 
Finally, Part VI brings together these threads and argues that Sorrell’s 
reasoning cannot be reconciled with the concept of a commercial speech 
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doctrine and is therefore incoherent, and that it has troubling implications 
for a great many areas of heretofore well-settled areas of regulatory 
authority, in particular, the existing regulation of off-label use marketing of 
pharmaceutical drugs. 
To understand the significance of Sorrell, we must begin by looking at 
why data mining is so important for pharmaceutical companies and how the 
sale of data implicates speech in any way (since it is not immediately 
apparent) and how the sale of data becomes speech for purposes of the First 
Amendment. Data mining is (or was) an integral part of pharmaceutical 
marketing. 
I. PHARMACEUTICAL SALES: THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILING 
“Detailing” is the name given the work done by pharmaceutical sales 
reps in promoting prescription drugs to doctors to prescribe to their 
patients.19 America was introduced to the seemingly no-holds-barred world 
of detailing in the movie Love and Other Drugs.20 There Jake Gyllenhaal 
plays Jamie Randall, a breezy, cheerful ladies’ man skating through life on 
patter and charm, one who rarely stays in one place long enough for his lies 
to catch up with him. The movie opens with Jamie fleeing his job selling 
electronics when his boss discovers Jamie having sex with his wife. Jamie, 
we learn, is something of an underachiever, a slacker who in his family’s 
view isn’t living up to his potential and doesn’t really want to. What he 
wants is to make the maximum amount of money for the minimum amount 
of effort, with plenty of time reserved for casual sex, recreational drugs, 
and drinking. Jamie has a flexible relationship with the truth and little 
concern for following rules; this, it turns out, means he is particularly well 
suited for a career in pharmaceutical marketing. 
While ostensibly being about a romance between a pharmaceutical 
sales rep and a young woman diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease, Love 
and Other Drugs is most interesting as an exposé of the way 
pharmaceutical companies market prescription drugs. In the movie the 
“detailers” are ruthless competitors who will use any means, fair or foul, to 
get their product into the right doctors’ hands. They accost doctors in the 
parking lot and offer free pens, umbrellas, lunch, and, most importantly, 
free samples of their drugs.21 Our hero, Jamie, uses all manner of snooping 
 
19. Julie M. Donahue et al., Effects of Pharmaceutical Promotion on Adherence to the Treatment 
Guidelines for Depression, 42 MED. CARE 1176, 1176 (2004). 
20. LOVE AND OTHER DRUGS (Twentieth Century Fox 2010) (based on the book Hard Sell: The 
Evolution of a Viagra Salesman by Jamie Reidy). See JAMIE REIDY, HARD SELL: THE EVOLUTION OF A 
VIAGRA SALESMAN (2005). 
21. One of the hazards of writing about the pharmaceutical industry is that it is fairly volatile. 
Some report that the practice of detailing itself is in decline. See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Pfizer Cuts 
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and skullduggery to attempt to worm his way into the relevant doctors’ 
good graces. The doctors are portrayed as cynically putting up token 
resistance but ultimately extracting the maximum benefit from the drug 
rep’s desperation to have them adopt and prescribe his company’s drug. 
The fictional Jamie steals competitors’ drugs, lies to obtain patients’ 
records, woos members of the staff of the physicians he visits, and engages 
in all sorts of other behavior of questionable ethics in order to gain a 
competitive advantage. 
Real life isn’t that different from fiction it seems. The movie was based 
on Hard Sell: The Evolution of a Viagra Salesman,22 the memoir of Jamie 
Reidy, a former Viagra sales rep. (The main difference between the book 
and the movie was that there was no love story in the book.) In Hard Sell 
Reidy recounts a plethora of tactics he used to try to get doctors to adopt 
his employer’s drugs. Among them was the marketing tactic at issue in 
Sorrell—using data mining to track which drugs doctors prescribe. Just as 
in all sales, Reidy says, “closing” is a critical part of pharmaceutical 
marketing.23 But unlike other sales contexts in which a sales pitch is 
concluded when the customer signs a contract or walks out with the 
product, in pharmaceutical sales it is difficult to know whether your sales 
pitch was effective because the sale is only complete when the doctor 
writes a prescription for your drug.24 So, using a time-tested selling 
technique, the detailer tries to get the doctor to make a commitment to 
prescribing X drug for the next ten patients who present with the condition 
for which the drug is marketed.25 Perhaps because people prefer to view 
themselves as persons who honor commitments, if you get an explicit 
commitment from a doctor that she will prescribe a drug in the future, she 
is more likely to do so than if no promise is extracted.26 But to measure the 
effectiveness of this tactic, detailers need to know if the doctor has actually 
kept that promise. 
Here is where data mining comes in. “Pharmaceutical companies pay 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to third-party firms that gather sales data 
 
Employee Severance Packages, PHARMALOT BLOG (Apr. 6, 2012, 8:36 AM), 
http://www.pharmalot.com/2012/04/pfizer-cuts-employee-severance-packages/. This decline does not 
mean drug companies are cutting back on marketing, merely that spending may be shifting to other 
areas. See also Ed Silverman, The Death of the Sales Rep is Greatly Exaggerated, PHARMALOT BLOG 
(Dec. 5, 2011, 8:51 AM), http://www.pharmalot.com/2011/12/the-death-of-the-sales-rep-is-greatly-
exaggerated/. See also Timothy Stolltzfus Jost, Oversight of Marketing Relationships Between 
Physicians and the Drug and Device Industry: A Comparative Study, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 333–34 
(2010) (describing detailing practice). 
22. REIDY, supra note 20. 
23. Id. at 32. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 57–113 (rev. ed. 2007). 
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from the nation’s pharmacy chains; reps get detailed reports informing 
them how many prescriptions—of their own drugs, as well as those of their 
competitors—each doctor has written in a particular week.”27 This allows 
the rep who discovers that a promise hasn’t been honored to police the 
promise: “Now, Doctor, last month you agreed to try Zithromax in your 
next ten otitis media patients. What stopped you from doing so?”28 
If it is true, as the research and the practices of the industry suggest, 
that an initial promise to prescribe a particular drug will generate more 
compliance than a sales encounter that does not end in a promise because 
people care about keeping their promises, it would seem to follow that the 
ability to follow-up on that promise and (in effect) ask people “why didn’t 
you keep your promise?” would be even more effective. The “third-party” 
data miners who make this follow-up possible are called prescription drug 
information intermediaries (PDII).29 
IMS Health, Inc., the plaintiff in the Sorrell case, is one such 
prescription drug information intermediary. It gathers information from 
pharmacies about the prescriptions doctors write. Although the patients’ 
names in the data are protected in accordance with the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA), prescribers’ names 
are not scrubbed.30 Thus, IMS and other PDIIs can organize the data by 
physician and by drug, so it is possible to see what drugs, and how much of 
each, every doctor is prescribing.31 Companies like IMS Health then buy 
lists of licensed physicians from the AMA and cross-reference these 
records against the records obtained from the pharmacies, analyze and 
summarize all of this data, and then sell it back to interested parties.32 
Although some purchasers are universities, government, and law 
enforcement, the primary market for this data is made up of pharmaceutical 
companies.33 
Armed with this information, the pharmaceutical company’s detailer 
can go into the sales call with more knowledge about the doctor’s 
prescribing practices than the doctor herself may have.34 “Sales 
 
27. REIDY, supra note 20, at 32. 
28. Id. at 32–33 (italics in the original). 
29. IMS Health Corp. v. Rowe, 532 F. Supp. 2d 153, 158 (D. Me. 2007). 
30. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011) (defining “protected health information” as “individually 
identifiable health information,” which includes demographic information, health condition, and 
payment, but not prescribers’ names); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d) (2011) (explaining that de-identified 
protected health information may be disclosed). 
31. REIDY, supra note 20, at 32. 
32. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of Prescribing Data for Drug 
Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 (2011). 
33. Id. 
34. Reidy notes that “[m]any physicians are unaware that their reps have access to [their 
prescription] information.” REIDY, supra note 20, at 32. 
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representatives can use the information to identify physicians who are high 
or low prescribers and early or late adopters, to decide which points to 
emphasize in their presentations, and to assess how effective their visits 
have been in modifying prescribing behavior.”35 
Predictably, many doctors feel this practice is incredibly intrusive.36 As 
one witness testified, having the detailer know so much information about 
his prescription practices “puts me at a disadvantage that I’m not 
comfortable being at.”37 Moreover, the evidence adduced in the cases 
litigating statutes like that of Vermont demonstrates that the purpose of 
data mining is to stimulate the sales of brand-name drugs.38 Studies suggest 
that “detailing has ‘a significant effect on physician prescription 
behavior.’”39 Presumably, at least in the industry’s view, data mining 
contributes to that success. 
On the surface this practice seems relatively benign because it enables 
companies to measure their results and thus to pitch drugs more effectively 
and efficiently and to minimize the waste of doctors’ time by, for example, 
reserving pitches for drugs to control diabetes to those doctors who have a 
great many patients with diabetes and not bothering to pitch it to those who 
don’t. Yet, as noted above, doctors often feel it impinges on their privacy. 
Data mining gives the detailer insight into the physician’s practice that he 
might prefer the detailer not have, not to mention that it permits the rep to 
manipulate the doctor’s response through the tactics of the hard sell. Data 
mining creates an asymmetry of information between the rep and the doctor 
that makes many doctors feel uncomfortable.40 
As an illustration, imagine this scenario: you are buying a new car. You 
go to the salesroom and make an offer. At some point in the negotiation, 
 
35. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, supra note 32. 
36. Although, as noted above, some survey evidence suggests that overall many doctors still find 
sales reps visits “very useful and of value” or “somewhat useful and of value.” See Silverman, The 
Death of the Sales Rep, supra note 21. 
37. IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 90 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (testimony of Dr. Gary Sobelson, a family practice physician). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 71 (quoting Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-
Physician Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y 
L. & ETHICS 785, 809 (2005)). 
40. Some have suggested to me that, to the extent many doctors welcomed detailing visits and all 
the free gifts and perks that came their way as a result of them, we should not be overly solicitous of the 
invasion of their privacy. There is no question that some (many?) doctors were complicit in 
encouraging the practice of detailing because of the perceived benefits. Yet there have always been 
some who objected to the practice and more still who, while perhaps enjoying some aspects of 
detailing, objected to what they viewed as an invasion of privacy. There are other doctors who profess 
to be not at all concerned about data mining. I do not attempt here to sort out what proportion of the 
profession objects or whether the failure to object to detailing as a whole ought to moot any objection to 
data mining. It is enough for my purposes here to observe that some physicians did object to having 
their data used this way and looked to the Vermont Legislature for relief. 
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the salesman goes to “see the manager” to discuss your offer and leaves 
you and your spouse alone in his office. While you are alone the two of you 
discuss the car, your real bottom line, all the issues you are concerned 
about, what you really liked, and what you are willing to give on. Imagine 
if, unbeknownst to you, the room is bugged so that the salesman has heard 
everything you said. He can now come back into the room and seem to 
magically know what you want and how far you can be pushed. Some 
doctors feel that having detailers know so much about their prescribing 
practices is like having that salesman listening in on your private 
conversation; it is an invasion of privacy that tilts the scales toward the 
seller. 
This is not all. Detailers try to promote their drugs for use in the widest 
possible population of patients, sometimes without proper regard for 
patient well-being. “Products that doctors prescribe in response to 
marketing may or may not be the most appropriate for particular patients. 
Patients who are prescribed inappropriate drugs may, of course, suffer side 
effects or experience no remediation or even an aggravation of their 
medical conditions.”41 Moreover, anything that artificially inflates the 
prescription of brand-name drugs may jeopardize patients’ health when 
they receive “new drugs for which safety and effectiveness data are 
limited.”42 “Several widely-publicized incidents in recent years have 
involved heavily marketed drugs such as VIOXX that turned out to be 
dangerous or ineffective.”43 
Critics of the practice argue that detailing generally boosts the sales of 
brand-name over generic drugs, thus driving up health care costs. Cost is a 
particularly important issue for state governments, which must reimburse 
for drugs prescribed to citizens covered by governmental medical plans. 
“Marketing . . . increases the cost of health care by leading to 
overprescribing of drugs and probably over-diagnosis of illnesses. In this 
way marketing drives up health care costs, which are often not directly 
borne by the patient because of public or private insurance.”44 
“Markets . . . generally fail to keep [drug] prices low because of low 
elasticity of demand driven by moral hazard. Because high prices are often 
coupled with low production costs, drug and device companies can expand 
their income by expanding their markets.”45 They largely accomplish this 
 
41. Jost, supra note 21, at 334. 
42. Mello & Messing, supra note 32; see also David Orentlicher, Prescription Data Mining and 
the Protection of Patients’ Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74 (2010). 
43. Jost, supra note 21, at 334. 
44. Id. (footnote omitted). 
45. Id. For a critique that excessive cost is endemic to the health care system in general, see David 
A. Hyman, Follow the Money: Money Matters in Health Care, Just Like in Everything Else, 36 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 370 (2010). 
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through a wide variety of marketing practices like detailing, many of which 
the FDA attempts (with only limited success) to regulate. 
For all these reasons (and others), the states of Maine, New Hampshire, 
and Vermont passed laws limiting the sales of prescription records for this 
purpose.46 In all three states, IMS Health, Inc. brought lawsuits seeking to 
have enforcement of the laws enjoined and the statutes struck down as 
unconstitutional.47 In Maine and New Hampshire, the company lost.48 But 
in Vermont the company struck pay dirt—it got a decision striking down 
the Vermont law. These outcomes paved the way for IMS Health to take its 
case to the Supreme Court, pointing out the circuit split as to the 
constitutionality of these three, relatively similar laws.49 In Sorrell the 
Supreme Court resolved that split by declaring Vermont’s statute 
unconstitutional; but its reasoning was sufficiently sweeping to render all 
three unconstitutional.50 
II. SORRELL V. IMS HEALTH, INC.: REGULATION OF MARKETING AS 
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION? 
Although motivated by similar concerns for doctor and patient privacy, 
health care costs, and patient safety, the statutes passed in Maine and New 
Hampshire differed slightly from that of Vermont. The Maine statute 
allowed for the sale of data unless the physician opted out,51 and the New 
Hampshire statute banned the sale of prescribing data altogether.52 The 
Vermont statute struck a position in-between these two and forbade the sale 
of prescribing data unless the physician opted into the practice.53 In other 
words, the Vermont statute allowed the doctor to decide whether he would 
permit the sale of information about his prescription practices for this 
purpose. But the default the law established that sales for marketing 
purposes would be prohibited.54 William H. Sorrell, the Attorney General 
 
46. Mello & Messing, supra note 32. 
47. IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (Vermont); IMS Health, Inc. v. Mills, 616 
F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (Maine); IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (New 
Hampshire). 
48. See Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (Maine); Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (New Hampshire). 
49. As discussed more fully in the text which follows, the laws were not exactly the same. And 
these differences might have made a difference to a Court interested in doing a finer-grained analysis 
under the Central Hudson test discussed infra. However, the Sorrell Court painted instead with a very 
broad brush and announced a standard that virtually ignored the Central Hudson test. 
50. See Mello & Messing, supra note 32, at 1252. 
51. Mills, 616 F.3d at 13. 
52. Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 47. 
53. IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The statute adopts an opt-in 
approach, allowing prescribers to opt in to allow the use of their PI data for marketing purposes.”). 
54. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83–87 (2008) (discussing importance of defaults). 
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for the State of Vermont, confirmed that one of the purposes of the 
Vermont law was to permit “doctors—not the government—to decide 
whether their prescribing information may be sold and used for marketing 
purposes.”55 The law was intended to give doctors control over how 
information about their prescribing practices could be used with respect to 
marketing efforts directed at them. 
The specific language of the Vermont statute, §4631(d), was as 
follows: 
A health insurer, a self-insured employer, an electronic 
transmission intermediary, a pharmacy, or other similar entity shall 
not sell, license, or exchange for value regulated records containing 
prescriber-identifiable information, nor permit the use of regulated 
records containing prescriber-identifiable information for 
marketing or promoting a prescription drug, unless the prescriber 
consents. . . .56 
Subsection (d) was a part of a larger statute entitled “Confidentiality of 
Prescription Information” which itself was just one part of a larger 
enactment, entitled “Prescription Drug Cost Containment.”57 The statute 
reflected legislators’ judgment that limiting the use of prescribing 
information for marketing purposes would have the effect of increasing 
prescriptions of generic drugs, thereby enabling the state to hold down 
reimbursement costs.58 
The pharmaceutical companies, in contrast, believed obtaining this 
prescribing information would boost sales of brand-name drugs, which is 
why they troubled to buy the data in the first place. They have no incentive 
to promote generics. When a drug’s patent expires, other companies are 
free to develop generic versions of the same drug. If doctors prescribe 
generics, it cuts into brand-name sales. Once a drug becomes very popular, 
companies vie to develop drugs that are fairly similar to the original. These 
are known as “me-too” drugs. “Me-too” drugs are re-tooled versions of 
older drugs that they replace.59 
As Dr. Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of 
Medicine, has observed, “the drugs most heavily promoted are me-too 
 
55. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779). 
56. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2002) (emphasis added). 
57. Id. §§ 4601–4634. 
58. Sorrell, 630 F.3d at 269, 275–79. Cf. Young, supra note 13 at 903 (“Simply put, Sorrell 
involved a quintessentially economic regulatory scheme covering activity that happened to be protected 
speech.”). 
59. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 74–76 (2005). 
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drugs, like Nexium and Lipitor and Paxil.”60 Because FDA regulations do 
not require that a drug company prove that a new drug is necessarily better 
than an older one, only that it is “effective,” it is possible to get FDA 
approval for a new drug that is pretty much like the old one.61 The chief 
advantage of doing so is that while the drug is under patent the company 
has exclusive rights and can sell it at a higher price. If the seller can 
convince doctors to prescribe the new, patented drug rather than the older 
generic form of the drug, this is of obvious financial benefit to the drug 
company that manufactures it. The benefits to the patient are much less 
clear.62 And the sale of more “me-too” brand name drugs where a generic 
would be effective unmistakably drives up health care costs. Such increases 
are bad enough in a recessionary time, but they are particularly hard to 
justify where there is no accompanying increase in the effectiveness of 
drugs. 
The Sorrell majority in the Supreme Court saw this as a dispute over 
“viewpoints”63 and declared the Vermont statute unconstitutional on the 
grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment’s guarantee that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”64 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,65 asserted that the Vermont 
statute “disfavor[ed] marketing, i.e., speech with a particular content,”66 
and therefore it needed to be subjected to “[h]eightened judicial scrutiny.”67 
According to Kennedy, a statute like Vermont’s, which treated marketing 
differently than other types of speech, is not content-neutral and as such 
must show that its “discrimination” on the basis of content is justified.68 
Vermont could not, in the majority’s view, do this, and thus the Court 
held the statute violated the First Amendment. Throughout the opinion 
Justice Kennedy characterizes Vermont’s attempt to regulate the marketing 
of prescription drugs as discriminatory. The opinion is replete with words 
like “disfavor” or “disfavored,” “discrimination,” “unwanted,” “identity,” 
“side,” “viewpoint” and “content.”69 “The law on its face,” Justice 
Kennedy declared, “burdens disfavored speech by disfavored speakers.”70 
 
60. Id. at 133. 
61. Id. at 75. 
62. Id. at 89–91. 
63. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011). 
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
65. The majority included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor 
in addition to Justice Kennedy. 
66. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2656. 
67. Id. at 2657. 
68. Id. at 2667. 
69. Id. passim. 
70. Id. at 2663 (emphasis added). 
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Reading the opinion one might be forgiven for thinking that this was a civil 
rights case rather than an issue of regulated pharmaceutical sales practices. 
This is—to say the least—a curious way to frame the issue given that 
any regulation of commercial speech (and presumably “marketing” is 
encompassed within the definition of commercial speech)71 could, applying 
this analysis, fail the content neutrality test because it “singles out” 
commercial speech for distinct treatment on the basis of its content—that 
is, because it is commercial.72 But that proposition makes a hash of the 
commercial speech doctrine and effectively (but not explicitly) overrules 
Central Hudson.73 
The available evidence suggests that when it created the commercial 
speech doctrine the Court never intended to allow marketers to assert the 
same freedom from governmental regulation of their sales pitches as 
political protesters may assert.74 Yet that is what Sorrell establishes. The 
Sorrell decision, with its antidiscrimination rhetoric, is the culmination of a 
prolonged “bait-and-switch” in which First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech, originally justified to protect consumers’ access to 
 
71. One of the persistent problems in this area is the conflation of “advertising” as synonymous 
with “commercial speech.” As discussed below and in the accompanying notes, there has never been a 
very good definition for what makes commercial speech “commercial” and little recognition that there 
is a great deal of what might be called “commercial speech” that is not advertising and some advertising 
that is not “commercial.” This shortcoming was pointed out very early on. See Steven Shiffrin, The 
First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 
NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1984). However, once the focus of the doctrine moved from listener-
oriented protection to content neutrality and the rationale in the political speech cases merged with that 
of the commercial speech cases (as I discuss more fully below), this issue of the definition was 
“solved,” albeit indirectly and without much in the way of analytical justification that directly took on 
the problems raised by Professor Shiffrin. Indeed, the mantel of content neutrality allowed the Court to 
side-step offering a justification for what is now (at least potentially) a threat of unconstitutionality over 
a very large swath of regulation that has, heretofore, “been thought to be economic regulation of speech 
that is beneath the protection of the first amendment.” Id. at 1215. Much of the remainder of this Article 
is intended as a forensic examination of how the doctrine evolved in a manner that permitted this 
question to be sidestepped. 
72. For a very long time, the commercial speech doctrine has been understood to represent a form 
of content regulation. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, & ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A 
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 42–43 (2012) (“Commercial speech 
doctrine authorizes the state to engage in content discrimination to suppress misleading information, 
and it empowers the state to compel the disclosure of information.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 194 (1983) (identifying 
commercial speech as one in a list of examples of content-based regulation of speech); Jeffrey M. 
Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 317–19 (1995) (identifying 
commercial speech as in the category of “low value” speech and subject to intermediate scrutiny). 
73. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
74. Cf., e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (anti-littering statute insufficient to permit 
government to suppress persons wanting to distribute political leaflets) with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
316 U.S. 52 (1942) (government may suppress on the grounds of an anti-littering statute, distribution of 
advertising leaflets, even where a political protest was appended to them). In addition there is evidence 
in the scholarly literature that few observers have thought that marketing as a category constitutes a 
viewpoint. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555, 560 (1989) 
(suggesting that commercial speech regulation is not regulation of a viewpoint). 
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truthful commercial information, has become, over time, a doctrine which 
considers commercial speech from the speaker’s standpoint, as if the 
speaker was promoting a viewpoint rather than a product.75 However, the 
Court obscures the degree to which its analysis elevates the speaker’s rights 
over the listener’s and perverts the rationale of protection for commercial 
speech by invoking content neutrality. 
Yet it is precisely on the basis of its content—its commercial 
character—that commercial speech has historically not been treated like 
fully protected speech. The commercial speaker does not speak for the 
“development of the mind”76 or express beliefs or opinions77—except to the 
extent that “please buy my product” can be construed as a “viewpoint.” The 
commercial speaker, no matter what it appears to be talking about, and in 
no matter what form that communication is delivered, is always attempting 
to promote a business. The seller’s viewpoint is always that its product is 
superior or ought to be purchased, even when that viewpoint is 
demonstrably false, as in the case of cigarettes, or highly dubious, as in the 
case of “me-too” drugs.78 Even an individual who is speaking on behalf of 
the commercial speaker may not actually personally believe that the 
product he is promoting is the best or will perform as portrayed. He is not 
required to. We understand that salespeople may sometimes engage in 
puffery,79 that they may be insincere in that they do not have a personal 
belief in all the claims they make, or are required to make, for a product. 
It is axiomatic that much of what sellers wish to say in aid of selling a 
product is of little use to the public, and a good deal of it may threaten 
grave harm. So it is not surprising that when the Court created the 
commercial speech doctrine and extended only limited protection to 
commercial speech, it justified this limited protection on the basis of the 
listeners’, not the sellers’, interests.80 
 
75. For the most recent example of this treatment see the D.C. Circuit’s opinion invalidating the 
FDA’s graphic warning labels. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063, 2012 WL 
3632003 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012). The majority uses very grand language asserting that the FDA’s 
graphic warnings represent an “attempt to level the playing field” with respect to inducements to smoke 
but that “as the Supreme Court recently reminded us” the government isn’t permitted under the First 
Amendment to regulate speech simply because it finds it “too persuasive,” and it cites Sorrell. Id. at 
*12. 
76. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4–5 (1966). 
77. Id. at 5. 
78. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 59, at 74–114. 
79. Puffery is a doctrine that seems to apply only to advertising whereby a statement, intentionally 
made and intended to cause reliance and which does cause such reliance to the detriment of the buyer, 
does not result in liability because the theory is that the buyer should not have believed it or relied upon 
it as it was obviously exaggerated. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brakes Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 966 F. Supp. 1525, 1531 (E.D. Mo. 1997), aff’d, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999). 
80. Indeed, some observers seem to argue that at bottom most of the rationales for why we protect 
freedom of expression are about protecting the interests of listeners and the meaning that they derive 
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Yet the doctrine had scarcely been announced before it began a subtle 
process of shape-shifting under a ceaseless and increasingly powerful 
barrage of arguments that the new doctrine was inherently illegitimate and 
antithetical to notions of freedom of speech because it gave commercial 
speech less protection than other protected speech.81 For the past decade or 
so, industry has regularly raised the First Amendment as a defense to a 
number of important governmental attempts to rein in false, deceptive, or 
harmful commercial speech. And it has been winning.82 But until now it 
had not succeeded in doing away with the doctrine altogether and obtaining 
a declaration that commercial speech is fully protected. For all practical 
purposes this is what Sorrell provides. 
III. “BAIT”—THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The commercial speech doctrine was created in 1976.83 Prior to that 
date, most judges and scholars did not think that commercial speech had 
 
from speech rather than about the speaker’s interest in speaking. See Larry Alexander, Low Value 
Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989). Similarly, other commentators argue that the First 
Amendment’s prohibition on government regulation of speech is (or ought to be) totally focused on the 
government’s purpose (i.e. whether it intends to ban communication) and not at all on the speaker’s 
communicative intents, particularly when it comes to the problems of expressive acts or the speech/act 
distinction. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001). 
81. The proponents of this position cast their arguments in a way that makes every victory for 
commercial or corporate speech a victory for the First Amendment, a proposition that is only true if you 
agree that the First Amendment is properly extended to these categories. This can result in the feeling 
you have entered into some sort of strange parallel universe when you read the output of organizations 
such as the Washington Legal Foundation which describes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Sorrell as a 
“sweeping, pro-First Amendment” decision. Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free 
Speech or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 129 (2011). Proponents of this 
argument seem to be epistemically indifferent to whether protection for commercial and corporate 
speech actually will ensure quantitatively more speech or a greater variety of viewpoints. In fact, 
because of the wide disparity in resources between commercial and non-commercial speakers, as well 
as the parallel intellectual property protection for some commercial speech like trade dress and brands, 
there is some reason to believe that First Amendment immunity from regulation will result in 
commercial and corporate speech drowning out other speakers. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, 
Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1161, 1176–77, 1182–83 (2004). Moreover, it is abundantly clear as an empirical matter that the “truth 
will out” proposition is unfounded. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 897, 899 (2010). 
82. See Samp, supra note 81, at 129. 
83. As noted earlier, there is actually some ambiguity about what the phrase “commercial speech 
doctrine” refers to, see supra note 6, as the Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Press had identified 
Chrestensen as the genesis of the “commercial speech doctrine.” Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973) (“The commercial-speech doctrine is traceable 
to the brief opinion in Valentine v. Chrestensen . . . .”). Presumably what the Court in Pittsburgh Press 
meant by this phrase was the exclusion of advertising from First Amendment coverage. See Neuborne, 
supra note 6, at 438 n.3. That is not how the phrase is used today. Today that phrase is generally used to 
refer to the cases from Virginia Pharmacy forward, except by those who argue that it was Valentine 
itself which newly (and inappropriately) established the subordinate status of commercial speech. See, 
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any First Amendment protection at all because in 1942 the Supreme Court 
had rather unceremoniously rejected the idea that the First Amendment had 
any application whatsoever to advertising.84 In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 
the owner of a submarine docked at a wharf on the East River in New York 
had sought permission to distribute a handbill advertising the opportunity 
to tour the submarine for a fee.85 He was told that this handbill would 
violate the city sanitation code meant to address littering but that handbills 
involving informational matters or protests were not covered by this 
ordinance.86 
After receiving this advice Chrestensen came up with a plan to reprint 
his flyers so that on one side they contained a protest against the City Dock 
Department for refusing to permit him to dock his submarine at the city 
pier for exhibition purposes.87 On the other side was essentially the same ad 
that had been rejected before (minus information about the fee), urging the 
public to come tour his submarine.88 Chrestensen attempted to distribute 
the revised handbills but was restrained by the police.89 In response, he 
brought an action seeking an injunction on the grounds that the ordinance 
violated the Constitution.90 The trial and appellate courts agreed with him 
that the ordinance was inconsistent with the First Amendment, but the 
Supreme Court reversed noting that although the Constitution provided that 
“the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of 
communicating information and disseminating opinion” and that the states 
had limited powers when it came to restraining such activities, this was not 
the case with respect to commercial speech.91 “We are . . . clear that the 
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely 
commercial advertising.”92 It rejected Chrestensen’s argument that the 
addition of a political protest changed the handbill’s essential character as a 
commercial appeal.93 
And this is where the matter lay for the next couple of decades. 
 
e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 6, at 627 (“In 1942, the Supreme Court plucked the commercial 
speech doctrine out of thin air.”). 
84. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
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A. Harbingers of Change 
By the early 1970s, the way legal scholars thought about advertising in 
connection with the First Amendment was changing. A number of 
prominent academics94 (and some then not so prominent law students)95 
argued that the distinctions between fully protected speech and commercial 
speech were difficult to sustain. In 1965, a student note in the Harvard Law 
Review observed that the First Amendment was relevant to commercial 
advertising because of its informational functions.96 Nevertheless, the 
anonymous author concluded that “[t]he possibly desirable objectives 
furthered by advertising would not seem to require its protection by the 
first amendment, particularly since the primary purpose of commercial 
advertising is to advance the economic welfare of business enterprises, 
over which state and federal governments enjoy wide powers of 
regulation.”97 
Two years later, in 1967, the Harvard Law Review, in its 
“Developments in the Law” section, published an enormous comment 
entitled Deceptive Advertising.98 This comment argued that the distinctions 
between protected non-commercial and unprotected commercial speech 
rested on shaky intellectual foundations. “Commercial advertising,” its 
authors99 proclaimed, “might well be called the stepchild of the first 
amendment.”100 Still, those authors were not prepared to say that no 
restraint on commercial speech was appropriate. And, like the earlier note, 
the comment identified “information” as one of the social benefits of 
advertising. Advertising, the comment observed, “serves to facilitate” the 
process of matching producers and willing consumers.101 In addition, the 
authors noted that advertising stimulated demand102 (an important function 
 
94. See Martin A. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the 
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971). 
95. See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191 
(1965); Comment, Developments in the Law, Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005 (1967). 
96. Note, supra note 95, at 1194. 
97. Id. at 1195 (emphasis added). The author of this note was concerned primarily with the 
constitutional status of shareholder voting and labor disputes and mentioned commercial advertising 
only by way of example. It was clear the author took for granted governmental power to regulate 
commercial speech. 
98. Comment, supra note 95. 
99. According to knowledgeable sources, the “Developments” feature usually involved multiple 
authors, and like all the student work in the Harvard Law Review, it is unattributed. Email from John H. 
Langbein, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to Tamara Piety, author (Jan. 14, 2012, 1:13 PM) (on 
file with author). 
100. Comment, supra note 95, at 1027. 
101. Id. at 1008. 
102. Id. The argument that advertising stimulates demand is somewhat controversial since the 
tobacco companies (among others) have argued that advertising only stimulates brand switching, not 
demand. See, e.g., JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING AND 
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in cases of over-production, which some say characterized the post-WWII 
American economy)103 and “enriche[d] mass culture; the images and 
methods used by advertisers comprise a significant source for humor, 
satire, and the graphic arts.”104 Furthermore, advertising was what 
supported much of broadcast television, newspapers, and magazines.105  
Despite these early signs that perhaps the categorical treatment of 
advertising under the First Amendment was about to undergo a major shift, 
it is clear from both of these works that the authors took for granted the 
proposition that the government had a legitimate role in regulating 
marketing. 
Indeed, the legitimacy of governmental regulation of commercial 
speech was so well-settled that the great First Amendment scholar Thomas 
Emerson could, in 1970, write his magisterial general theory attempting to 
categorize all of the various grounds for protecting freedom of expression 
and the purposes the First Amendment serves and barely touch the question 
of commercial speech. Thus he wrote: 
The principles governing commercial speech, and the relations 
between this sector and the area of free expression, have never 
been worked out. That task is not attempted here. Up to the 
present, the problem of differentiating between commercial and 
other communication has not in practice proved to be a serious 
one.106 
He was right; it had not been a serious problem before. It was about to 
become one. Those student authors were onto something. The ground was 
shifting under Emerson’s feet, and what had only been worth a passing 
 
REGULATION 75 (1997) (claiming there is “no substantial effect from advertising on consumption”). On 
the other hand, it strains credulity to claim that advertising has no impact on demand when advertisers, 
professionals in the field, and academic sources claim advertising is essential to creating demand. See, 
e.g., TERENCE A. SHIMP, ADVERTISING, PROMOTION & SUPPLEMENTAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED 
MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS 18 (6th ed., 2003) (“The objective [of marketing] . . . is to move people 
to action.”). Moreover, the justification for a tax deduction for advertising expenditures is that they are 
“ordinary and necessary” business expenditures under the tax code. 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a) (2011). How 
could they be “necessary” if it is not as generative of income? Indeed, some argue that because 
advertising generates long term goodwill, which is an intangible asset, these expenditures ought to be 
capitalized, not treated as a deduction (which essentially turns them into a tax credit). See Mona L. 
Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 347, 414–22 (2000). 
103. I am not aware of any serious dispute about whether the end of WWII meant that American 
businesses experienced a serious sudden surplus of productive capacity. The evidence suggests that the 
prevailing wisdom, reflected also in the Harvard Law Review Comment above, was that advertising 
was an important stimulus for consumption of this excess capacity. See, e.g., LIZABETH COHEN, A 
CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POST WAR AMERICA (2003). 
104. Comment, supra note 95, at 1016. 
105. Id. 
106. EMERSON, supra note 76, at 105 n.46 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
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mention in 1970 would become, by the end of the decade, a distinct and 
developed body of law based on a new theory about what the First 
Amendment protects.107 
B. The First Developed Theory for Protection 
In 1971 Professor Martin Redish published an extended argument for 
the proposition that commercial speech ought to be afforded greater First 
Amendment protection than it currently enjoyed. The article was entitled 
The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the 
Values of Free Expression.108 It is, as he would be happy to tell you,109 
apparently the first sustained argument for first amendment protection for 
commercial speech outside of the student pieces mentioned above. 
However, like those pieces, Redish focused his argument for the protection 
for commercial speech largely on the grounds of the listeners’ interests in 
receiving information110 and in their concomitant interest in self-
determination through the exercise of choices with this information and 
rather less on the interests of the speaker.111 
Although he acknowledged that “[a] cursory examination of current 
television and periodical advertising reveals that in practice, comparatively 
little commercial promotion performs . . . a purely informational 
function,”112 Redish thought this was not an insurmountable obstacle to 
recognizing the informational and indeed educational function of 
advertising, since it was often the case that consumers needed the 
extraneous entertainment aspects of advertising to know what they really 
wanted.113 Some advertising he observed serves “to develop an entirely 
new set of wants on the part of consumers.”114 Moreover, “entertainment 
techniques frequently must be employed to effectively attract potential 
 
107. See Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, supra note 6. 
Note the words “and Regulating” in this title. Sorrell suggests that there will be rather more protection 
than regulation going forward. 
108. Redish, supra note 94. 
109. Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech 
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 553 (1997) (“Honest, I 
really was the first one. . . . Five years before the Supreme Court held that commercial speech was 
deserving of First Amendment protection, long before any scholarly commentator had even intimated 
that commercial speech was worthy of consideration as ‘speech’ for purposes of the constitutional 
guarantee, there I was, arguing that because commercial speech ‘advances [the individual] toward the 
intangible goal of rational self-fulfillment,’ it was properly characterized as protected expression.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
110. Redish, supra note 94 passim. 
111. Id. passim. 
112. Id. at 433. 
113. Id. at 434. 
114. Id. at 432 (quoting A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 196 (4th ed. 1962)). 
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consumers to the information conveyed.”115 “Information received in the 
commercial context . . . is specifically designed to assist the individual in 
the decision-making process.”116 “[W]e [should] require an open exchange 
of ideas and information in the marketplace that will help the individual 
govern his personal life.”117 
Indeed, the entire article is an extended encomium on the pride of place 
of self-fulfillment and self-determination in what he describes as “generally 
accepted . . . Western thought.”118 Relying heavily on Alexander 
Meiklejohn and Thomas Emerson, Redish argued that “[s]elf-
government . . . is premised on a belief in the integrity of the individual 
intellect.”119 Nevertheless, he wrote, “extensive behavioral research [shows 
that] the modern individual apparently spends little time and effort 
concerning himself with affairs of the political process.”120 Despite this 
disjunction between aspiration and reality, Redish observed that our system 
of protection for political speech commits us to trusting this often 
uninformed individual with political decision-making.121 It would be 
paradoxical, Redish argued, to offer less protection where the citizen’s 
decision-making is arguably more keenly animated by the concerns of his 
daily life—to wit, in his purchasing decisions.122 
What is significant about this argument is that it is focused almost 
exclusively on the listener’s interests in hearing the speech rather than on 
the speaker’s interest in speaking—even as to that aspect of human 
experience which might naturally seem to describe speakers’ rather than 
listeners’ interests—self-fulfillment. The bulk of the article focuses on the 
ways in which advertising (and other commercial speech) contributes to the 
 
115. Id. at 434. 
116. Id. at 445. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 438. 
119. Id. Note that this argument, by employing terms like “self-government” and “rational 
faculties,” is manifestly referring to human beings who live and breathe, not to corporate persons. 
120. Id. at 440. The reference and reliance on behavioral research is interesting because there is 
now a great deal more of this type of research, and not just consumer behavior, than there was in 1971. 
And many observers have argued that the fruits of this research support arguments for more regulation 
of advertising/marketing rather than less. For a review of the arguments with respect to just one area, 
food marketing, see Pierre Chandon & Brian Wansink, Is Food Marketing Making Us Fat? A Multi-
Disciplinary Review, (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2011/64/MKT/ISSRC, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/sbstract=1854370; Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: 
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2005); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 
(1999). This point is also made by a prominent behavioral economist, Dan Ariely, although he couches 
it with the maximum ambiguity about just how much governmental intervention he is proposing by 
referring to “public policy.” DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT 
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 238–244 (2008). 
121. Redish, supra note 94, at 440. 
122. Id. at 442–43. 
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self-fulfillment of listeners. Respect for human self-fulfillment, Redish 
argued, requires protection of this category of speech, which (in his view) 
demonstrably contributed to that self-fulfillment. 
He hardly discussed the self-fulfillment commercial speech might offer 
speakers. This was apparently deliberate. Indeed, he wrote, “Since 
advertising performs a significant function for its recipients, its values are 
better viewed with the consumer, rather than the seller, as the frame of 
reference.”123 He did not make a sustained argument for the “expressive” 
interests of commercial speakers. 
I do not believe this was accidental. The idea that we ought to protect 
commercial speech because of the speaker’s interest in speaking would 
have probably been a non-starter. Certainly it would have been far less 
appealing. Consider what that argument would have looked like. Instead of 
arguing that human beings’ self-expression finds one outlet in consumption 
decisions, therefore the ability to receive truthful information on which to 
make those decisions should be protected, the argument would have to be 
that engaging in commerce is itself an expressive activity warranting First 
Amendment protection. In other words, instead of the argument being, 
“The consumer has a right to hear about Colgate because choosing a 
toothpaste is an expressive activity” (already a somewhat dubious 
proposition), it would be, “Colgate has a right to try to pitch toothpaste 
because selling toothpaste is an expressive activity.” This construction 
confuses expression with commerce. 
While commerce and expression are obviously by no means mutually 
exclusive—for instance, most artists want to sell their work, not to give it 
away—it cannot be said they are identical. If they were, how would it be 
possible to regulate commerce at all? It is difficult to see how you regulate 
commerce if you cannot regulate commercial speech. Yet if all commerce 
 
123. One of the notable exceptions is his observation that “[m]uch advertising which does not 
convey concrete information nevertheless represents the artistic creation of an individual, and as such 
deserves recognition as first amendment speech.” Id. at 446–47. This is a curious example for a couple 
of reasons. In the first place, there is no “author” credited in advertising (outside of trade publications 
which attribute particular campaigns to particular ad agencies or even particular “creatives”). Second, 
lack of attribution is not surprising since all advertising is work for hire in which the “artist” has no 
proprietary interest. See Catherine Fisk, The Modern Author at Work on Madison Avenue, in 
MODERNISM AND COPYRIGHT 173, 183–84 (Paul Saint-Amour ed., 2010) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1693973. So it is a curiosity, to say the least, to use 
the artistic nature of the endeavor to justify First Amendment protection but to use copyright to deny the 
“artist” the fruits of her labor. Query: whose rights are being protected in this construction? If it is really 
the artist’s, then one would think these interests would similarly extend to copyright. And if they don’t, 
it suggests that copyright law’s supremacy in this regard reveals advertising as principally property, not 
expression. For more speaker-oriented arguments, see also Redish, supra note 94, at 461–68 and 
accompanying footnotes (discussing distinguishing between speakers on the basis of their financial 
interests and the specific case of tobacco regulation). 
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is speech and speech cannot be regulated, it would seem that commerce 
cannot be regulated. 
This is true at both the institutional and the individual level. All work, 
whether running a business or working as an employee, no matter how 
menial, routine, or repetitive, offers the worker some opportunity to express 
herself through how she performs it. But that is different from saying that 
the principal reason for these activities is rooted in their expressive content. 
To conclude that all work, all business constitutes expressive activity 
would be wildly over-determined. It would sweep all work into the ambit 
of expression.124 
On its face such a construction may, among other consequences, set the 
First Amendment and the Commerce Clause at odds with one another, 
since the latter delegates to Congress broad powers to regulate commerce 
while the former forbids Congress to make laws which encroach on 
freedom of expression. Without doing a lengthy exegesis into unsolved 
(and probably unsolvable) problems of proper constitutional interpretation, 
suffice it to say that it seems implausible that the proper resolution to any 
conflict between these two provisions would be to read Congress’ power to 
regulate commerce out of the Constitution on the grounds that: 
(1) The First Amendment says Congress shall make “no law” 
restricting freedom of speech. 
(2) “Speech” = “expression.” 
(3) People express themselves through commerce. 
(4) Therefore commerce = expressive activity which Congress may 
not regulate. 
The resolution of this conflict more consistent with our past 
understanding of the First Amendment is: 
(1) Congress may regulate commerce. 
(2) Commercial speech is a part of “commerce.” 
(3) Therefore, commercial speech is a part of commerce which 
may be regulated as a matter of power under the Commerce 
Clause, the First Amendment notwithstanding. 
Even if one concludes that the First Amendment, because it is an 
amendment, somehow trumps the Commerce Clause, a reading as broad as 
 
124. Although I disagree with some of his analysis and conclusions therein, Professor Jed 
Rubenfeld offers a powerful refutation of the proposition that all conduct is expressive for purposes of 
the First Amendment. Rubenfeld, supra note 80 passim. 
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the first would seem to seriously undermine Congress’ power to regulate 
commerce.125 
It is easy to see though how framing the interests at stake as those of 
the listener presents both a limiting and an equalizing element into the 
proposition that commercial speech ought to be protected. Listeners are set 
against big government that would paternalistically keep them ignorant. 
And there is nothing about empowering consumers with information that 
suggests a corollary right on the part of the speaker to be free of 
government regulation. Framed this way it is easy to understand the appeal 
of the listeners’-rights argument and why the Court was persuaded to 
conclude that some commercial speech deserved First Amendment 
protection. 
Although not everyone was persuaded by this argument—some 
prominent scholars vigorously objected that the First Amendment had no 
place for commercial speech126—the majority of the legal community 
appeared to embrace, if somewhat more reservedly than Redish himself, 
the proposition that consumers ought to enjoy some First Amendment right 
to receive information. And even before the Supreme Court created the 
commercial speech doctrine, a few scholars seemed prepared to agree that 
commercial speech ought to receive some protection,127 although even 
supporters were not prepared to say that it ought to enjoy full First 
Amendment protection.128 
IV. THE COURT TAKES THE BAIT 
A. Nibbling Around the Edges 
We should not be surprised that those Harvard Law students focused 
on advertising and its regulation in the late sixties. Advertising had become 
 
125. Although the Commerce Clause deals with federal supremacy to regulate interstate commerce 
and not all commerce generally, in practice, at least in modern times, states’ attempts to regulate 
commercial practices tend, as in Virginia Pharmacy itself, to be read as implicating interstate commerce 
and are thus subject to federal preemption. And of course the First Amendment’s provisions apply to 
the states as well through the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the argument in the text collapses what 
might be some more subtle distinctions in specific circumstances. 
126. Victor A. Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First 
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger 
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422 (1980); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6. See also Richard M. Alderman, 
Commercial Entities’ Noncommercial Speech: A Contradiction in Terms, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 731, 
731–32 n.4 (1982) (extensive survey of the literature following the Virginia Pharmacy decision 
including these as well as other articles). 
127. See, e.g., Kenneth L Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975). 
128. See Alderman, supra note 126 (discussing reaction to Virginia Pharmacy). Note that the 
Alderman article seems to have been among the first to link the commercial and corporate speech cases. 
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a significant driver of cultural content, and a handful of important cases 
had, at least nominally, involved advertising. In New York Times v. 
Sullivan129 the defendants, who had taken out an ad in the New York Times 
in support of Dr. Martin Luther King and the civil rights marchers in the 
South, were sued for libel and defamation over factual inaccuracies in the 
ad. The advertisement was what is known in the advertising business as an 
“issue ad.”130 Issue ads are ad spaces purchased to promote social or 
political causes. The Court found for the defendants and created a new 
standard for libel and defamation cases involving public figures and issues 
of public concern. Henceforth, plaintiffs would need to show that the 
defendants’ misstatements were not just erroneous, but that they were made 
with “actual malice.” That the statements were contained in an ad was not 
the focus of the opinion, and the Court observed that the mere fact that 
money was paid to run the ad did not make it “commercial” (and hence 
subject to the “no First Amendment protection at all” standard under 
Chrestensen).131 
A few years later, the Court heard a case involving a challenge to the 
practice of dividing the help-wanted ads into categories like “Jobs-Male 
Interest” and “Jobs-Female Interest.”132 The National Organization for 
Women had filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human 
Relations against the Pittsburgh Press complaining that this practice was in 
conflict with a Pittsburgh city ordinance forbidding discrimination on the 
basis of sex.133 The Commission held a hearing and enjoined the practice, 
and the Pittsburgh Press appealed.134 When the case came before the 
Supreme Court, the Court supported the Commission and ruled that the city 
ordinance did not violate the First Amendment.135 It nominally upheld the 
principle announced in Chrestensen, but it also observed that New York 
Times v. Sullivan had made clear that “speech is not rendered commercial 
by the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement.”136 
 
129. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
130. SHIMP, supra note 102, at 286. Shimp actually just describes issue advertising in the context 
of corporate issue advertising, but because the ad in Sullivan was paid for by plaintiffs, it fit the 
definition of advertising even though it was not “commercial.” Shimp defines “advertising” as “[a] form 
of either mass communication or direct-to-consumer communication that is non-personal and is paid for 
by various business firms, nonprofit organizations, and individuals who are in some way identified in 
the advertising message and who hope to inform or persuade members of a particular audience.” Id. at 
621. 
131. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266. 
132. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
133. Id. at 376–79. 
134. Id. at 380–81. 
135. Id. at 391. 
136. Id. at 384. Some date the development of First Amendment protection to commercial speech 
from this case. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 437 n.2. 
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Two years later in a third case, Bigelow v. Virginia,137 the Court was 
confronted with a challenge to a Virginia law which made it illegal to 
advertise the availability of abortions. Abortions were illegal in Virginia, 
but the ad announced that abortions were legal in New York, that there was 
no residency requirement, that all inquiries would be “strictly confidential,” 
and that counseling and other information about the termination of 
unwanted pregnancies was available at the location and number 
provided.138 The prohibition on the advertising was premised on the state’s 
power to restrict the promotion of abortion services given that abortion was 
illegal in the state. The State of Virginia had prosecuted the publisher of a 
newspaper under a criminal statute making it a misdemeanor to “encourage 
or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage.”139 
The Court struck down the law.140 In so doing, it expressly limited the 
holding in Chrestensen observing that “[t]he fact that the particular 
advertisement in appellant’s newspaper had commercial aspects or 
reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First 
Amendment guarantees.”141 Chrestensen’s holding, the majority wrote, “is 
distinctly a limited one” relating to “the manner in which commercial 
advertising could be distributed.”142 “The case obviously does not support 
any sweeping proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.”143 
This proposition was not obvious at all to the dissenting Justices. In a 
dissent written by Justice Rehnquist, in which Justice White concurred, 
Rehnquist argued that, contrary to the majority’s interpretation, 
Chrestensen had heretofore stood for the proposition that the exclusion of 
commercial speech from First Amendment protection was, if not total, at 
least broad enough to encompass regulation of the sort Virginia sought to 
enforce.144 The majority, Rehnquist wrote, did not “confront head-on the 
question which” the case posed but instead made “contact with it only in a 
series of verbal sideswipes.”145 
Because the Bigelow decision came so closely on the heels of the 
Court’s landmark decision in Roe v. Wade,146 it was initially unclear to 
observers whether the decision rested on the content of the ad, that is, 
whether it was the fact that the ad was for abortion services that justified 
 
137. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
138. Id. at 812. 
139. Id. at 812–13. 
140. Id. at 829. 
141. Id. at 818. 
142. Id. at 819. 
143. Id. at 820 (emphasis added). 
144. Id. at 830–32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. at 829–30. 
146. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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the decision or whether it reflected a more general turn to offer greater 
protection for commercial speech. The former proposition seemed likely to 
some, but this interpretation would seem to violate the precept that First 
Amendment protection should not vary on the basis of content. As the 
dissent noted, “we have always refused to distinguish for First Amendment 
purposes on the basis of content . . . .”147 
Yet, the majority opinion explicitly stated: “We need not decide in this 
case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of 
advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or 
even prohibit.”148 Like Bigelow, both the New York Times v. Sullivan and 
the Pittsburgh Press cases clearly involved civil rights issues that had 
economic aspects and so were also not clearly just commercial. 
B. Hooked: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Born 
All doubts about whether Bigelow signaled more expansive protection 
for commercial speech were dispelled a year later with the decision that is 
often credited for creating the commercial speech doctrine, one that 
ironically also involved pharmacies and prescription drugs—Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumers Citizens Council, Inc. 
[hereinafter Virginia Pharmacy].149 There, a consumers’ group challenged 
a Virginia law that prohibited pharmacies from engaging in price 
advertising.150 The State defended the law on the grounds that permitting 
price advertising might lead pharmacies to engage in price wars that could 
decrease pharmacies’ profit margins, possibly leading them to cut back on 
services to consumers.151 Since accurate and complete information about 
prescription drugs could have an obvious impact on public health, the State 
argued that good service, for example, in the form of individualized 
attention from pharmacists, was of sufficient importance to warrant 
suppression of price advertising.152 
The Court disagreed. Instead it found that, “[a]s to the particular 
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information, that 
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s 
most urgent political debate.”153 And it unequivocally announced that 
commercial speech enjoyed First Amendment protection.154 This 
 
147. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
148. Id. at 825 (majority opinion). 
149. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
150. Id. at 753–54. 
151. Id. at 767–68. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 763. 
154. Id. at 770. 
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announcement tracked, almost to the letter, the recommendations made five 
years earlier by Professor Redish. However, as in that early Redish article, 
the Supreme Court spent almost none of its discussion justifying this new 
protection for commercial speech on the basis of the speaker’s interests. 
Instead, the Court focused almost exclusively155 on the benefits of freedom 
for truthful commercial speech for the listeners. 
This focus on the consumer’s interest highlighted a curious aspect of 
the case. The case was brought by consumers, not pharmacists, and thus did 
not engage with the question of the speakers’ interests.156 Therefore, there 
was a serious question as to whether the consumer group had standing to 
challenge the statute since the Virginia law did not prohibit consumers 
from publishing information about prescription drug prices, just 
pharmacies.157 Indeed, a good deal of the opinion is given over to 
discussing this standing issue and then analyzing the question from the 
perspective of the listeners. 
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may 
seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is 
producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what 
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise 
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be 
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter 
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be 
 
155. The Court actually assumed away the very question that might be said to have been before 
it—whether commercial speakers have a First Amendment right to speak—since the Court assumes, 
without offering any rationale, that “of course” speakers have these rights, and if speakers do, so must 
listeners. That “of course” does not necessarily reflect that speakers’ rights have precedence over 
listeners, rather only that the concept of listeners possessing cognizable First Amendment rights was a 
somewhat more novel and perhaps controversial proposition at the time. This sleight of hand was 
assisted by the fact that it was the consumers who were bringing the suit, and thus, there was a standing 
problem. As the Court noted, the earlier precedent did not unequivocally establish protection for 
commercial speech. Indeed, Chrestensen did the opposite. But in order to get to the listeners, the Court 
apparently seemed to believe it had to find a right for speakers. It did so not by analysis or exploration 
of the arguments for and against protecting commercial speech on behalf of speakers, but simply by 
fiat, announcing it had found such a right even though, arguably, the existence of such a right was 
precisely the question before the Court. The remainder of the opinion is devoted to outlining why 
listeners might have a protectable First Amendment right as well, and the entire argument for justifying 
protection for commercial speech is written from the perspective of the listeners. For an early 
discussion of this aspect of the case, see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6, at 6, 16–17, 25. Of particular 
note is the authors’ observation that the listeners’ interest in hearing price advertising constituted “[a] 
more potent consideration” than that of the pharmacists to advertise. Id. at 25. 
156. See Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s 
Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004). 
157. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of 
commercial information is indispensable.158 
These were the Court’s justifications for offering expanded protection 
to commercial speech: the consumer’s interest in commercial information; 
the notion that consumer decisions might be more personal, more relevant 
to their self-fulfillment in their everyday lives than political speech; the 
relentless focus on the listeners’ interests and the proposal that listeners had 
cognizable rights under the First Amendment to receive information as 
much as speakers had to speak; and the proposition that good decisions 
were related to good information, and since advertising provided at least 
some information, it therefore aided good decision-making and could be 
said to supply a public benefit.159 All these arguments were raised by 
Redish in his 1971 article.160 
There was, however, at least one critical difference between the 
arguments set forth by the Court and those offered by Redish. Although 
Redish had acknowledged in passing, without much elaboration, that his 
proposal would not eliminate the government’s ability to regulate false 
commercial speech,161 the Court in Virginia Pharmacy, perhaps because it 
was moving out of the realm of theory and into the creation of actual law, 
was at some pains to make clear how governmental regulation of 
commercial speech could essentially continue, if not as before, certainly 
without losing anything essential. In footnote 24 the Court noted: 
 In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment 
protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from 
other forms. There are commonsense differences between speech 
that does “no more than propose a commercial 
transaction,” . . . and other varieties. Even if the differences do not 
justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus 
subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless 
suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure 
that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is 
unimpaired. The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be 
more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news 
reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser 
seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or 
service that he himself provides and presumably knows more about 
 
158. Id. at 765 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
159. Id. at 763–69. 
160. Redish, supra note 94. 
161. Id. at 462. 
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than anyone else. Also, commercial speech may be more durable 
than other kinds. Since advertising is the sine qua non of 
commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being chilled by 
proper regulation and forgone entirely. 
 Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and hardiness of 
commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate 
inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the speaker. . . . They 
may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message 
appear in such a form, or include such additional information, 
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being 
deceptive. . . . They may also make inapplicable the prohibition 
against prior restraints.162 
Footnote 24 makes unequivocal at least two points relevant to the 
Court’s most recent decision in Sorrell: first, that as conceived, the 
protection that the Court was extending in Virginia Pharmacy was more 
limited than that given to fully protected speech163 and would require a 
content-based inquiry into whether speech was commercial before applying 
this new intermediate level of scrutiny; and second, that this intermediate 
level of scrutiny was not merely permissible, it was “necessary.” The 
Sorrell Court’s content-neutrality analysis is completely at odds with both 
of these limiting principles. 
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent to the Virginia Pharmacy majority 
opinion. He thought this decision, “which elevates commercial intercourse 
between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a bargain 
 
162. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
163. In yet more evidence that the Supreme Court is making stealthy inroads on Virginia 
Pharmacy there was a curious citation to it in the 2012 decision in the “Stolen Valor” case. United 
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). In Alvarez the Court struck down a statute which made it a 
crime to lie about being a Medal of Honor recipient on the grounds that the statute regulated content 
and thus was subject to a strict scrutiny review which it did not survive. Brushing aside previous case 
law in which the Court had suggested that false speech had no First Amendment value, Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, observed that the First Amendment must sometimes protect some 
false speech, citing Sullivan. Id. at 2545. Just before that observation he reviewed the precedent which 
described the various categories of speech which had traditionally constituted exceptions to the content 
neutrality requirement. Id. at 2544–45. In a string cite of these cases which included the usual 
references to “fighting words” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)) and “obscenity” 
(New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S 747 (1982)), among others, Justice Kennedy offers the following 
category: “fraud, see Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 771 (1976) . . . .” Id. at 2544. In the past, the words “commercial speech” would have appeared 
where Justice Kennedy put the word “fraud.” Thus, with a few keystrokes the holding in Virginia 
Pharmacy is reduced to the proposition that the government may regulate fraud. This is manifestly not 
the case. What was distinctive about Virginia Pharmacy was that it established some limited First 
Amendment protection for truthful commercial speech while reaffirming the government’s authority to 
regulate even truthful speech if it met the intermediate scrutiny test. A commercial speech doctrine 
reduced to the proposition that the First Amendment does not protect fraud is one that is vanishingly 
small if it exists at all. 
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to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace 
of ideas,”164 was likely to have “far reaching” consequences that the 
majority did not, perhaps, sufficiently appreciate.165 Moreover, he was not 
persuaded by the argument that the public interest in information in a free 
market necessarily meant this interest was of a constitutional dimension: 
While there is again much to be said for the Court’s observation 
[about the preservation of a properly functioning free market] as a 
matter of desirable public policy, there is certainly nothing in the 
United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature 
to hew to the teachings of Adam Smith in its legislative decisions 
regulating the pharmacy profession.166 
In Justice Rehnquist’s view, the argument that the First Amendment 
protected the right to receive information as well as to disseminate it was 
related to protection for political, social, and artistic expression and matters 
of public concern, not purely private ones. “It is undoubtedly arguable that 
many people in the country regard the choice of shampoo as just as 
important as who may be elected to local, state, or national political office, 
but that does not automatically bring information about competing 
shampoos within the protection of the First Amendment.”167 He predicted 
that the Court’s new interpretation would be difficult to cabin and might 
well be used to challenge the laws regulating the professions, the sale of 
securities, cigarettes, alcohol, and other products the promotion of which, 
like prescription drugs, the government had legitimate interests in 
regulating.168 
Rehnquist’s concerns would prove him prescient, but it would take 
some time for the seeds planted by Virginia Pharmacy to give rise to 
Citizens United and, ultimately, to Sorrell. 
C. The Central Hudson Test 
Four years after the Virginia Pharmacy decision, the Court elaborated 
on the contours of its newly created doctrine by articulating a test that the 
Court said applied to regulations of commercial speech. In Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,169 the 
utility company challenged the constitutionality of a regulation that 
 
164. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 784 (emphasis added). 
167. Id. at 787 (emphasis added). 
168. Id. at 789. 
169. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
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prohibited promotional advertising by the utility. New York sought to 
decrease consumption of electricity in the interest of energy 
conservation.170 The utility objected that the prohibition violated its 
constitutional rights.171 In this case, unlike in Virginia Pharmacy, it was the 
speaker who was raising the challenge. And, once again, the Court struck 
down the regulation in question, but this time it did so while providing a 
more detailed template for analyzing future commercial speech cases. 
In order for a questioned regulation to survive a First Amendment 
challenge under the commercial speech doctrine the Court said four 
elements of the regulation must be assessed. 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come 
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and 
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more 
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.172 
Once again, the decision was not unanimous. As before, Justice 
Rehnquist felt the majority had been insufficiently deferential to legitimate 
state interests. Although he conceded that Virginia Pharmacy was now the 
law and was prepared to accept the new test the Court had devised in 
Central Hudson, he disagreed with its application of that test to the facts in 
this case.173 In declining to give more deference to the Commission’s 
determination of how to best address its energy conservation goals, Justice 
Rehnquist believed the majority had revived the discredited Lochner-era 
approach to economic regulation.174 And he reiterated his view that in 
creating the commercial speech doctrine, the Court had opened a 
“Pandora’s box.”175 
This time, however, Rehnquist was not alone in disagreeing with the 
majority; except that far from thinking the Court had been too generous in 
granting First Amendment status to this speech, these other Justices argued 
 
170. Id. at 559. 
171. Id. at 560. 
172. Id. at 566. 
173. Id. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
174. Id. at 589. 
175. Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This concern was also raised by two of Virginia 
Pharmacy’s most trenchant critics, Professors Jackson and Jeffries. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 
6, at 30–31 (“In short, the Supreme Court has reconstituted the values of Lochner v. New York as 
components of freedom of speech.”). 
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that the majority had not been generous enough and should have applied a 
stricter standard. Justices Brennan and Stevens thought that the line 
between commercial and non-commercial speech presented in the case was 
blurrier than the majority suggested, and they argued that perhaps this 
should not have been a commercial speech case at all.176 Justice Blackmun 
wrote that the Public Service Commission’s regulation was “a covert 
attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by 
persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the 
information needed to make a free choice.”177 
Once again we see this trope of concern for decision-makers having the 
information they need to make decisions even if one is hard-pressed to 
identify the informational aspects of commercial propaganda.178 Rather 
than probe this question, the Court seemed content to work with a very 
loose definition of “information.”179 So even though the claim was raised 
by the commercial speaker, the arguments in favor of protecting the speech 
continued to focus on the ways in which freedom for the speaker meant—
as the majority saw it—freedom for the listener as well. 
 
176. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572–73 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 579 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
177. Id. at 574–75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
178. I use the word “propaganda” because I mean to encompass far more than mere advertising in 
referring to commercial persuasion. This is in contrast to the proposition that the term “commercial 
speech” is synonymous with the term “advertising.” Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6, at 1 (equating 
commercial speech with “business advertising”). And although in common parlance the word 
“propaganda” is often used as if it invariably entails untrue or unfair methods, I don’t think that is 
accurate. The term may be properly used any time one is referring to attempts to persuade versus 
attempts to inform. See EDWARD BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA (1928). Of course there isn’t a neat or easy 
division between information and persuasion, and most communication may have a persuasive element. 
What distinguishes commercial speech and (to my mind at least) warrants the label “propaganda” is 
that, for a commercial firm touting itself or its wares, there is no internal norm or public expectation 
that what is issued from the commercial firm is to be unbiased or complete. It is expected that the seller 
of a product will say only positive things about that product. This is not the case with scholarship, 
journalism, and judicial opinions, to offer only a few examples. How the norms of the marketplace have 
so suffused all communication such that we tend to think it normal for journalists to have a “slant,” 
government to be “an interest group,” and the very existence of impartial sources to be distrusted is 
sufficiently complicated a topic as to warrant a separate article or book on its own, and so, I cannot 
adequately explore it here. There is undoubtedly no completely unbiased form of communication. This 
is not to say, however, that there is no difference between those forms of communication that have at 
least pretensions to objectivity and those which are not even nominally bound by such pretensions. 
Marketing in its various forms, including public relations, is not, I submit, even nominally bound by the 
sorts of internal norms that supposedly bind attorneys as zealous advocates, for example, to 
acknowledge and distinguish contrary authority. Instead, it is unequivocally one-sided. That, I think, 
makes the term propaganda warranted. 
179. It turns out that industry has very asymmetrical notions of what constitutes “information.” 
Although their own promotional speech is justified as “information,” in the case attacking the FDA’s 
graphic warning labels, the tobacco companies successfully argued these graphic pictures are meant as 
persuasion, not as information intended to support informed choice and therefore the rule requiring the 
companies to carry these “messages” was unconstitutional. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. vs. U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin., 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063, 2012 WL 3632003 
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).  
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There was little discussion of the expressive interests of the speaker, 
and this is no surprise. The usual speaker-oriented arguments for protecting 
freedom of expression, which rely on notions of the importance of 
autonomy, of the importance of using and developing one’s rational 
faculties, and of the importance of self-determination, have little or no 
resonance with respect to a corporation. A corporation is a legal fiction, not 
a living thing. It does not, itself, have such needs. As one observer put it: 
The barely intelligible idea that corporations could have 
independent rights of their own, apart from the interests of affected 
persons, might be suggested by judicial decisions establishing that 
corporations are persons for various legal purposes. But this 
manner of speaking does not mean that corporations have feelings, 
interests in self-expression, or other characteristics of human 
beings that make them persons.180 
Central Hudson became a key marker in the development of the 
doctrine. From that time to this, Central Hudson has remained the 
controlling test for assessing challenged regulations of commercial speech. 
At the time it was announced, and for several years afterwards, it appeared 
to genuinely constitute an intermediate scrutiny test—that is to say, from 
time to time some governmental regulations would survive review.181 Over 
time, the test has been applied in a manner closer to strict scrutiny.182 
However, even as the Court became increasingly skeptical of governmental 
regulations of commercial speech, preservation of the Central Hudson 
framework reinforced the notion that the regulation of commercial speech 
was subject to a distinct and at least nominally less rigorous level of 
scrutiny than that of other protected speech—a proposition which is at 
some odds with the Sorrell Court’s content-neutrality analysis. Yet, a 
 
180. Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-Commercial 
Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 398–99 (2006). Similar objections are raised in conjunction with the 
Citizens United decision. See, e.g., Robert Weissman, Let the People Speak: The Case for a 
Constitutional Amendment to Remove Corporate Speech from the Ambit of the First Amendment, 83 
TEMP. L. REV. 979 (2011). 
181. Another way of describing the standard was that the Court had characterized commercial 
speech as “low value” speech and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny or balancing instead of speech 
designated as “high value.” See Stone, supra note 72, at 194–97; Sunstein, supra note 74. For critiques 
of the high value/low value distinction, see Alexander, supra note 80; Steven G. Gey, The First 
Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
182.  Vladeck, supra note 6 at 1055–59. Even before Sorrell it seemed fair to say that, as a 
practical matter, the Central Hudson test was intrinsically flawed since prongs (3) and (4) of the test are 
in tension with one another. Regulation that is effective under prong (3) is likely to be deemed 
overbroad under prong (4). On the other hand, if regulators attempt to create a law with narrow 
application to avoid prong (4), there is a substantial likelihood that it will not survive the prong (3) test 
for effectiveness. 
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persistent problem has been uncertainty about what made speech 
“commercial.” 
D. The Content Problem: What Makes Speech “Commercial”? 
The Central Hudson test starts out with a problem. And it is a content 
problem. The first prong under the test is whether the speech “concern[s] 
lawful activity” and is not misleading.183 This is a requirement for the 
doctrine to apply. Thus, untruthful or misleading commercial speech is not 
protected at all, nor is commercial speech about a product that is illegal. 
However, the fact that speech is truthful does not make it “commercial.” 
And it could not be the case that speech concerning an unlawful activity, 
for example arguments to legalize marijuana use, would be prohibited by 
the First Amendment. So there must be some quality by which courts 
identify and distinguish commercial from non-commercial speech: a 
distinction that is obviously content-based. Yet, in establishing the 
doctrine, the Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy did not provide a very 
clear definition of what made speech “commercial,” and subsequent 
decisions did not prove much more illuminating.184 
The Virginia Pharmacy majority thought there were “commonsense” 
differences, but it did not elaborate on what those differences might be. Yet 
the difference is (was) critical.185 As noted above, very early into the 
development of the new commercial speech doctrine, Professor Steven 
Shiffrin observed that there was a serious definitional problem. 
Each commercial speech case the Court has considered has 
involved advertising or the proposal of a commercial transaction, 
and almost all of the commentators have looked at the “commercial 
speech” problem through the lens of commercial advertising. The 
collective myopia has distorted something quite important: the 
commercial speech that has been beneath the protection of the first 
 
183. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
184. The Court has said that government may “distinguish between the relative value of different 
categories of commercial speech” when such distinctions would not be permissible as to 
noncommercial speech, thereby suggesting that content neutrality is not as important in commercial 
speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514 (1981). See also Young v. Am. Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68 (1976) (“We have also made it clear . . . that the content of a particular 
advertisement may determine the extent of its protection.”). 
185. For a discussion of the importance of definition, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, 
What is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 
(2004); James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: 
Lessons From Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091 (2004); Nat Stern, In Defense of the 
Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 83–87 (1999) (summarizing critiques). 
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amendment for all these years has not been confined to commercial 
advertising.186 
Indeed, he wrote, advertising and, more generally, speech that proposes 
a commercial transaction is “only the tip of the iceberg.”187 That iceberg 
contains a very large body of law regulating what companies can say to 
their shareholders, what issuers of securities can say to the public, and what 
employers can say to their employees in the face of union organizing 
activities, antitrust laws, laws regulating lobbying, and a “host of 
government regulations.”188 
The definition the Supreme Court offered for commercial speech in 
Virginia Pharmacy was one it had previously floated in the Pittsburgh 
Press case: “speech that does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction.’”189 That definition was extremely narrow and was later 
supplemented (although subsequent commentators sometimes neglect to 
mention this) in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.190 In Bolger, the 
Court expanded the definition to cover materials that did more than merely 
propose a commercial transaction. Bolger involved a pamphlet that 
discussed the role of condoms in preventing sexually transmitted diseases. 
The pamphlet mixed promotional material with a discussion of a matter of 
public concern. 
This was the tactic that the plaintiff in Valentine v. Chrestensen had 
used to no effect when trying to insulate his flyers from treatment as mere 
advertising. Of course, in light of Virginia Pharmacy, even purely 
commercial speech would not be deprived of all protection because of its 
commercial character. But, it remained to be seen whether, after Virginia 
Pharmacy, the inclusion of some discussion of a matter of public concern 
would deprive the speech of its commercial character and, thus, entitle it to 
enhanced protection under a strict scrutiny standard, or whether even the 
inclusion of some non-promotional material would fail to completely 
overshadow its commercial character such that the intermediate scrutiny 
standard would still apply. 
The Bolger Court opted for the latter approach: “Because the degree of 
protection afforded by the First Amendment depends on whether the 
activity sought to be regulated constitutes commercial or noncommercial 
speech, we must first determine the proper classification of the mailings at 
 
186. Shiffrin, supra note 71, at 1213 (footnotes omitted). 
187. Id. at 1214. 
188. Id. at 1214–15. 
189. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973)). 
190. 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
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issue here.”191 It noted, citing New York Times v. Sullivan, that although the 
fact that the pamphlet was (1) concededly an advertisement, that fact would 
not be enough to render it commercial speech.192 However, the combination 
of that fact along with (2) a reference to a product and (3) an economic 
motivation on the part of the speaker could support a finding that the 
pamphlet was properly categorized as commercial speech.193 
So, although the Court ultimately held that the brochure in question 
was protected speech, it came to that conclusion only after it had defined 
the speech as “commercial” and then applied the Central Hudson 
intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech.194 It did not apply the 
strict scrutiny test that would have been applicable if the brochure was fully 
protected speech under the First Amendment. Indeed, the entire exercise of 
parsing the brochure to determine what sort of speech it contained would 
have been nonsensical if the Court thought that content was irrelevant. 
Around 1993, the Supreme Court began interpreting the Central 
Hudson test more rigorously, and the notion of content-neutrality made its 
first appearance in a doctrine that, by definition, presupposed the propriety 
of a content-based distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
protected speech. The case was City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 
Inc.195 There, the Court struck down an attempt to regulate the presence of 
news racks containing commercial flyers differently than those containing 
traditional newspapers.196 Here, perhaps, is the first intimation that singling 
out commercial speech for different treatment on the basis of its 
commercial content might run afoul of the First Amendment—even though 
the doctrine is predicated on such a distinction. 
Nevertheless, the Court cautioned that its holding was “narrow.”197 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted, “we do not reach the 
question whether, given certain facts and under certain circumstances, a 
community might be able to justify differential treatment of commercial 
and noncommercial newsracks.”198 Rather, the Court held that: 
[i]n the absence of some basis for distinguishing between 
“newspapers” and “commercial handbills” that is relevant to an 
interest asserted by the city, we are unwilling to recognize 
Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the “low value” of commercial 
 
191. Id. at 65 (emphasis added). 
192. Id. at 66. 
193. Id. at 67. 
194. Id. at 66–75. 
195. 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
196. Id. at 430–31. 
197. Id. at 428. 
198. Id. 
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speech is a sufficient justification for its selective and categorical 
ban on newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills.”199 
The Discovery Network opinion asserted that the 
commercial/noncommercial distinction bore “no relationship whatsoever to 
the particular interests that the city has asserted.”200 
Although Discovery Network appears to have introduced this content-
neutrality concept into the commercial speech context, it was in a more 
modest form than that adopted in Sorrell. Content neutrality is brought in at 
the end of the analysis after applying the Central Hudson test. Indeed, 
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion because he wished to urge 
the Court to dispense with Central Hudson on the grounds that it offered 
“insufficient protection for truthful, noncoercive commercial speech 
concerning lawful activities.”201 
In contrast, in Sorrell, content neutrality is the first and most critical 
inquiry, with Central Hudson bringing up the rear. And Vermont had 
offered far more than a “bare assertion” that data mining for marketing 
purposes was “low value.” Its reasons for enacting the law had a 
demonstrable connection between the law and the state’s interest in 
reducing health care costs by encouraging the prescribing of generic drugs. 
We know that because the sellers’ eagerness for the data arose directly 
from its connection to the successful promotion of brand name drugs. So 
how did we get from the Discovery Network’s conception of content-
neutrality to Sorrell’s? 
The answer is hinted at in the references to commercial speech as “low 
value” speech that litter the opinions of the majority and concurring 
opinions. The implication is that designating something as “low value” is 
offensive in some way, particularly when the listeners may find it valuable. 
There is a studied disapproval of what sounds like discriminatory or 
paternalistic judgments with respect to what constitutes high versus low 
value speech. This disapproval is the content-focused aspect that can be 
referred to as “the equality principle” in the First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
That equality principle had its roots in a completely different context—
the Civil Rights Movement. But, its importation into the commercial and 
corporate speech contexts was to have far-reaching consequences. It would 
represent the “switch” in the focus of the commercial speech doctrine. 
From the moment it was introduced, it began to pave the way for an 
increasingly robust right for commercial speakers, one that would 
 
199. Id. at 443. 
200. Id. at 424. 
201. Id. at 431 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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subordinate the interests of the listeners, which had justified the doctrine in 
the first place, and would mean that, when challenged, the government 
would have to overcome increasingly high hurdles to justify regulation of 
marketing. 
V. “SWITCH”: THE SHIFT TO THE SPEAKER 
Five years after Redish published his seminal article, the Court 
announced the commercial speech doctrine, and as the 20th century 
advanced, what might be called the “commercial equality” position picked 
up legitimacy and steam.202 By the early 1990s, there was a noticeable 
uptick in the publication of articles in law reviews that argued for greater, 
or even full, First Amendment protection for commercial speech or 
corporate speech.203 This was matched by an increase in hostility in the 
Supreme Court toward governmental attempts to regulate commercial 
speech. And, in both areas, the rhetoric shifted away from 
consumer/listener-oriented arguments and toward content–discrimination 
 
202. Interestingly, what was most noticeable early on was that those who would have typically 
been identified as “liberal” or “progressive” were no longer as willing to treat the First Amendment or 
rights language as sacred cows. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist 
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990). Professor Balkin presciently observed 
that “conservative forces soon will overtake and appropriate the libertarian approach to first amendment 
law that progressives have used so effectively in the past.” Id. at 386. 
203. The argument has been forcefully made that all expression by a commercial entity is, by 
definition, “commercial speech.” See Bennigson, supra note 180. The list of articles arguing for 
expanded protection for commercial speech includes Redish’s 1971 article, supra note 94, as well as the 
following articles (although this is by no means an exhaustive list): Developments in the Law—
Corporations and Society, Free Speech Protections for Corporations: Competing in the Markets of 
Commerce and Ideas, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2272 (2004); Kozinski & Banner, supra note 6; Charles H. 
Moellenberg & Leon F. DeJulius, Jr., Second Class Speakers: A Proposal to Free Protected Corporate 
Speech from Tort Liability, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 555 (2009); Neuborne, supra note 6; Larry E. Ribstein, 
Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (1992); Rodney A. Smolla, Information, 
Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 777 (1993); Symposium, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, Remarks by Michael 
Gartner, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1173 (1988); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 
YALE J. ON REG. 85 (1999). 
Interestingly, many of the articles supporting this viewpoint were written by attorneys in private practice, 
some of whom focus their practices on precisely these issues. While there is nothing particularly sinister 
about that, it raises another issue—the distortion in the “marketplace of ideas” that may arise from an 
imbalance of resources and incentives where some have both the means and a keen financial interest in 
shaping the law. One way to do that (or attempt to do it) is to “seed” the academic literature. See, e.g., 
Shireen A. Barday, Notes, Punitive Damages, Remunerated Research, and the Legal Profession, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 711 (2008); Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Jr., Academic Integrity and Legal 
Scholarship in the Wake of Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33 (2010); 
Thomas O. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and the Integrity of Sponsored Law and Economics 
Research, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 51 (2010). Because in the past there was no well-developed norm 
about financial disclosures, law reviews may be particularly vulnerable to being used this way. For a 
discussion of how the the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor obscures important differences between the 
search for truth and Pareto optimality in the market for goods and services, see Alvin I. Goldman & 
James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996). 
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arguments for protecting commercial speech. Tellingly, little rhetorical 
firepower was expended to make arguments grounded on a strong 
speaker’s rights theory for the speaker’s right, as a speaker, to “express” 
himself. Even this newer focus on content owed much of its persuasiveness 
to arguments about the social benefits of hearing all views expressed. 
A. The Equality Principle in Freedom of Expression 
As everyone knows, the 50s and 60s, the period that preceded Virginia 
Pharmacy, saw the momentous changes wrought by the Civil Rights 
Movement. It was a dramatic time. America was also embroiled in a war in 
Vietnam, and a vigorous movement had arisen to protest it. The Women’s 
Rights Movement was beginning (once again) to make its political 
influence felt, this time not merely on the issue of suffrage for women but 
on issues of reproductive freedom, equal pay, and freedom from sexual 
coercion and harassment. And again, in the course of both of these 
movements, lives were lost (Kent State) and protestors often experienced 
violence from the opposition or official violence in the form of arrest. The 
social and legal consequences of these movements for equal justice were 
vivid and salient in the mid-70s. 
Then, as now, many people associated the First Amendment with these 
movements and protests. Civil rights and the First Amendment went 
together. The Civil Rights Movement gave rise to several important First 
Amendment cases in which civil liberties claims intertwined with economic 
claims (such as jobs listings in the classified ads) or commercial means of 
distribution (newspaper advertising). In many instances, arguments for 
equal protection under the law seemed to merge seamlessly into arguments 
for protecting freedom of speech. Scholars argued that the First 
Amendment encompassed equal protection or “equal liberty” to speak.204 
This work, and the cases which adopted this framework, would provide the 
rhetorical framework at the heart of the reasoning in Sorrell. One of the 
most eloquent advocates of this equal liberty argument was Professor 
Kenneth Karst.205 
Professor Kenneth Karst and others argued that the First Amendment 
necessarily contained an equal protection justification: that the principle of 
protection for freedom of expression must have at its core the notion that 
freedom of speech was only achieved if that freedom was shared by all.206 
“The principle of equality, when understood to mean equal liberty, is not 
 
204. See infra note 205. 
205. Karst, supra note 127, at 21. 
206. Id. 
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just a peripheral support for the freedom of expression, but rather part of 
the ‘central meaning of the First Amendment,’”207 Karst wrote. 
Like Professor Redish before him, Professor Karst constructed an 
impassioned argument for this equal liberty proposition predicated on 
philosophical and political commitments to the importance of informed 
choice by citizens in the search for truth “to permit each person to develop 
and exercise his or her capacities, thus promoting the sense of individual 
self-worth.”208 And he showed particular skepticism for what he called 
(after Professor Kalven) the “two-level” theory of speech, a theory in 
which some speech is deemed wholly outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.209 This theory, he thought, was justifiably on its way out. Yet, 
he observed that “[o]ne last area where an offspring of the two-level theory 
survived longer than it deserved is the area of advertising and ‘commercial 
speech.’”210 “Just as the prohibition of government-imposed discrimination 
on the basis of race is central to equal protection analysis,” he claimed, 
“protection against governmental discrimination on the basis of speech 
content is central among first amendment values.”211 
When Professor Karst wrote this article, however, the commercial 
speech doctrine itself was still a year away even though there had been, as 
noted above, a few rumblings about protection for commercial speech. At 
the time, the high value/low value debate seemed largely to revolve around 
the pornography issue.212 So, it seems unlikely Karst intended to argue that 
a host of regulatory institutions, ones considered legitimate for decades, 
 
207. Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964) and Harry Kalven, Jr., The 
New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. 
REV. 191 (1964)). 
208. Id. at 23. 
209. Id. at 30–35. Another way of expressing this is as “low value” versus “high value” speech. 
See supra note 72. 
210. Karst, supra note 127, at 33 (emphasis added). He goes on to call this a “darkened . . . corner 
of the first amendment until very recently.” Id. He then discusses several of the cases discussed in the 
next Part, praising some as upholding the equality principle and criticizing others as inconsistent with it. 
Yet, what is clear from the nature of the cases is that not one of them raised the questions that are raised 
today under the banner of this equality principle—namely, whether marketing itself (not the particular 
product or message but all marketing) is a “viewpoint” such that governmental regulation can be said to 
offend content neutrality where it attempts to regulate it. Id. at 29–35. For a discussion of the distinction 
between content-based versus viewpoint-based restrictions, see Stone, supra note 72. 
211. Karst, supra note 127, at 35. Some distinguished scholars have disputed this claim that 
content neutrality has any place in First Amendment analysis of commercial speech. See Robert C. Post, 
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 49 n.222 (2000–01) (“[T]he 
distinction has virtually no application within the domain of commercial speech, where most regulation 
is content based.”). 
212. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 88 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(noting with respect to the Court’s upholding a zoning regulation of adult theaters that rigorous 
enforcement of the First Amendment may protect “speech that seems to be of little or no value” but 
“that is the price to be paid for constitutional freedom,” a construction that is very similar to that 
adopted here by Justice Kennedy in Sorrell). 
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should be dismantled. It seems even more doubtful that when he wrote 
these words he had any inkling that, many years later, this idea of “equal 
liberty” would be used as a justification for saying that the government 
may not exclude multinational global corporations like GE, ExxonMobil, 
Shell, Nike, or Microsoft from participating in political advertising or that 
the First Amendment must shelter an array of marketing practices, 
regardless of their negative social consequences.213 Yet, that is where 
others would like to take it. 
If it is hard to picture the large, multinational corporation as an 
oppressed minority in need of the protection of the counter-majoritarian 
power of the Court to counteract state-sanctioned discrimination, it is likely 
that is because no one imagined it would come to that. Yet, once the 
commercial speech doctrine was created, this “equal liberty” strand of 
argument quickly served as a basis for arguments that a separate standard 
of review for commercial speech amounted to content discrimination. 
Over time, these two streams of thought—(1) that commercial speech 
is valuable for consumers and should be protected on that basis and (2) that 
the First Amendment encompasses an equal protection aspect that prohibits 
courts from distinguishing amongst speakers or types of speech—would 
(predictably) converge with a third legal principle—(3) that of corporate 
personhood and corporations as holders of First Amendment rights—to 
create the right of corporate political speech. It was perhaps especially 
inevitable that these streams would converge given the enormous resources 
devoted to making arguments in court and in law reviews that commercial 
speech deserved full First Amendment protection.214 
B. Nondiscrimination and Corporate Political Speech: “Content” as a 
Stand-In for Speaker Rights 
A mere two years after Virginia Pharmacy was decided, the Court 
decided another seemingly unrelated case that shifted the Court’s focus to 
the interests of the speaker and set the course that culminated in Sorrell—
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.215 In that case, the Court faced a 
 
213. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at the Ground Level: The Consequences of 
Nonstate Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591 (2005) (arguing that government should encourage and support 
actions by private, nongovernmental actors to remedy discrimination). 
214. See supra note 203. At present there is no way to say for sure which (if any) of these articles 
were subsidized by particular industries, underwritten by law firms, or commissioned in the manner 
described in the Exxon punitive damages example in Epstein & Clarke, supra note 203. But it seems 
unlikely that the number is zero. The record of amicus briefs in the various commercial speech cases 
that have come before the Court since 1976 speak for themselves. This is, however, the subject for a 
future article. 
215. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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challenge to a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from 
spending money from their general treasuries to defeat or pass referenda 
unless the referendum was one that affected the corporation’s business.216 
The state’s Attorney General, Francis Bellotti, interpreted this provision to 
forbid corporations from participating in advertising on a referendum 
relating to personal property taxes.217 The First National Bank of Boston 
disagreed and brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the 
statute declared unconstitutional.218 The lower court had rejected the 
Bank’s claim and upheld the statute.219 The Supreme Court reversed.220 
Justice Powell, who only a few years before had been urging his friend 
Eugene Sydnor, Jr. at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to engage in a full-
scale, broad-ranging effort to rehabilitate the image of business,221 wrote 
the opinion. Although the issue as framed by the parties and the lower court 
had been whether the corporate identity of the speaker was determinative of 
its First Amendment rights, this framing put the spotlight on the 
corporation itself, which was not conducive to applying the usual rhetoric 
about the need for self-expression as an attribute of human intellect, since 
obviously, a corporation is not a human being. Justice Powell nimbly 
sidestepped this difficulty, however, by reframing the question. 
The court below framed the principal question in this case as 
whether and to what extent corporations have First Amendment 
rights. We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The 
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party 
seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, 
serves significant societal interests. The proper question therefore 
is not whether corporations “have” First Amendment rights and, if 
so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. 
Instead, the question must be whether §8 abridges expression that 
the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.222 
By redirecting the focus to the content of the speech, Powell essentially 
ignored the issue as it had been presented. To propose that the question was 
whether political advertising, as a category, was protected by the First 
 
216. Id. at 767–68. 
217. Id. at 769. 
218. Id. at 769–70. 
219. Id. at 771. 
220. Id. at 795. 
221. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell to Eugene B. Syndor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, on Attack of American Free Enterprise System (Aug. 23, 1971), available at 
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate_accountability/powell_memo_lewis.html. 
222. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775–76 (emphasis added). 
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Amendment was to answer it: of course it was. But, it meant that there 
would be no deeper examination of whether any of the expressive purposes 
of the First Amendment would be served by extending its protection to 
private, commercial institutions or whether these entities needed the 
protection of the courts in order to make their views known. Instead, the 
Court framed the issue as one of the public’s right to hear all “viewpoints.” 
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest 
that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of 
speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is 
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather 
than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its 
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity 
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or 
individual.223 
In this one paragraph (later to be repeated countless times, not only in 
subsequent political speech cases, but in future submissions to the Court 
and in some decisions issuing from the Court with respect to commercial 
speech), the Court laid the foundation for a shift to focusing on a speaker-
centered analysis in the commercial speech doctrine. 
The two-year-old commercial speech doctrine did not support a reading 
that corporations’ protected speech was limited to its “business interests,” 
Powell wrote.224 To the contrary, that precedent, like the protection for 
political speech, was grounded in the public interest. “A commercial 
advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much because it pertains 
to the seller’s business as because it furthers the societal interest in the 
‘free flow of commercial information.’”225 This statement expressly 
eschewed locating the protection for commercial speech or the new 
protection for corporate political speech in the rights or needs of the 
speaker. Yet, at the same time, the first quote conjures up notions of 
equality, identity, antidiscrimination, and balance to frame the case as an 
issue of civil rights and viewpoint discrimination. Bellotti reads as if 
corporations can be said to have a “viewpoint” that would be systematically 
suppressed unless the Court came to their rescue. 
If a legislature may direct business corporations to “stick to 
business,” it also may limit other corporations—religious, 
charitable, or civic—to their respective “business” when 
 
223. Id. at 777 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
224. Id. at 784. 
225. Id. at 783 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
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addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the 
expression of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment. 
Especially where, as here, the legislature’s suppression of speech 
suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question 
an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First 
Amendment is plainly offended.226 
The opinion skillfully drew together various strands of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the long standing principle that corporations 
were “persons” for purposes of the Constitution,227 and the newly minted 
commercial speech doctrine to conclude that a rule that excluded speech 
based on the identity of the speaker was inherently illegitimate and 
discriminatory.228 In so doing, it made this decision seem like the natural 
and inevitable outgrowth of the Court’s jurisprudence rather than a fairly 
bold departure from it. This move shifted the balance of power over to 
speakers with an assumption that, simply because a commercial entity 
claimed it had something to say, it was necessarily in the public interest 
that the entity have an unfettered right to do so. 
Once again, Justice Rehnquist was not persuaded. “The question 
presented today,” he wrote, “whether business corporations have a 
constitutionally protected liberty to engage in political activities, has never 
been squarely addressed by any previous decision of this Court.”229 
Moreover, “[u]ntil recently, it was not thought that any persons, natural or 
 
226. Id. at 785–86 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Again, because the Court was avoiding 
answering the question of just what the constitutional status of corporations was for purposes of the 
First Amendment, it could elide the issue of whether there was a difference between for-profit and not-
for-profit corporations for purposes of the protection of speech. Had the analysis focused on the 
purposes of these disparate types of corporations, there may have been a basis for making a distinction 
between these types of organizations. And, indeed, more than a decade later the Court did draw a 
distinction between the status of for-profit and not-for-profit organization, holding that the government 
could more readily regulate the political speech of the former than the latter. Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661–65 (1990). Austin was of course the case that the Citizens 
United decision overturned. 
227. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 n.15 (“It has been settled for almost a century that corporations are 
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 
118 U.S. 394 (1886)). What this footnote neglected to mention was that this decision had not resolved 
the issue of whether corporations’ rights under that Amendment were exactly the same as human 
beings’ rights. That issue hadn’t been decided in the Santa Clara case, and in fact, subsequent decisions 
made clear that they were not completely parallel. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 
(1906) (protection for “liberty” under Fourteenth Amendment is limited to “natural, not artificial, 
persons”). Thus, the degree of First Amendment protection artificial persons like corporations would 
receive was precisely the question presented and precisely the one the majority refused to answer. This 
footnote also made no mention of the somewhat controversial manner in which the Santa Clara Court 
“settled” this question—“with neither argument nor discussion.” Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 822 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
228. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784–85. 
229. Id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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artificial, had any protected right to engage in commercial speech.”230 And 
“[a]lthough the Court has never explicitly recognized a corporation’s right 
of commercial speech, such a right might be considered necessarily 
incidental to the business of a commercial corporation.”231 This is not so of 
the right to engage in political activities. “It cannot be so readily concluded 
that the right of political expression is equally necessary to carry out the 
functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes.”232 The 
various states, Rehnquist observed, promulgate the laws under which 
corporations of all types are organized, and those laws both define the 
organizational purposes and provide a number of privileges that are 
intended to facilitate those purposes, among which are perpetual life and 
limited liability.233 
However, he noted that: “It might reasonably be concluded that those 
properties, so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in 
the political sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of 
political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the purposes for 
which States permit commercial corporations to exist.”234 “Indeed, the 
States might reasonably fear that the corporation would use its economic 
power to obtain further benefits beyond those already bestowed.”235 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s reservations seem, from today’s vantage point, 
extremely well founded. 
VI. THE INCOHERENCE236 AND DANGERS OF SORRELL 
As Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted, it has been hard for the Court to 
maintain those “common sense” distinctions between commercial speech 
and other protected speech. And to the extent that Bellotti was interpreted 
by some to mean that different treatment for corporations or commercial 
entities violated the First Amendment, the notion that the commercial 
speech doctrine’s intermediate scrutiny standard was in some way 
“discriminatory” became a persuasive argument industry would regularly 
 
230. Id. at 825 (emphasis added). 
231. Id. 
232. Id. (emphasis added). 
233. Id. at 824–26. 
234. Id. at 826 (emphasis added). 
235. Id. 
236. I use the word “incoherence” to connote what I view as the lack of logical coherence between 
the different aspects of the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence and the Sorrell rationale. I do not 
use the word in its other sense to mean “inarticulate” or incapable of articulating. 
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use to argue that any attempted regulation of commercial speech, or indeed 
liability for false statements, represented unconstitutional discrimination.237 
It has apparently been a compelling argument to many of the Justices. 
In the last part of the twentieth century and the beginning of this century 
we have seen a “paradigm shift . . . in which the focus has moved from 
consumer protection to speaker protection.”238 The rhetoric in Virginia 
Pharmacy was “wrapped up in notions of informed consumer choice and 
social utility. The case was not speaker-based but recipient-based.”239 
Beginning sometime in the 1990s,240 “the emphasis seemed to change, with 
greater attention paid to the rights of the commercial speaker.”241 
Justice Rehnquist’s reservations about these new avenues of 
constitutional protection that the Court had opened up reflect a 
conservative approach in what is the older sense of the word, that is, a 
cautious approach to change and an unwillingness to abandon the received 
wisdom of the past in favor of an untested formulation. His stance on both 
the commercial speech doctrine, as articulated in his dissents in Virginia 
Pharmacy and Central Hudson, and to the extension of protection to 
corporate speech in Bellotti, also reflected his commitment to a vision of 
federalism and separation of powers that counseled deference to legislative 
decisions, especially when they reflected “such a broad consensus . . . over 
a period of many decades” as was the case with the restrictions on 
corporate political speech in Bellotti.242 His form of conservatism did not 
prevail. 
One thing is clear: the commercial speech doctrine has undergone 
significant revision in the course of the ensuing four decades since it was 
announced. Its justifications today seem very far away from those 
originally offered to support some protection for commercial speech under 
the First Amendment, and the content-neutrality trope that Justice Kennedy 
adopts in Sorrell suggests a comprehensiveness not found in the actual law. 
As Professor Jack Balkin has pointed out, “the ideal of eliminating content 
based regulation was never realized in practice.”243 
 
237. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898–99 (2010); Piety, supra note 
14, at 19. 
238. Rodney A. Smolla, Free the Fortune 500!: The Debate over Corporate Speech and the First 
Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1295–96 (2004). 
239. Id. at 1296. 
240. Probably the case that signaled the shift was City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 
U.S. 410 (1993) discussed earlier. 
241. Smolla, supra note 238, at 1296. 
242. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
243.  Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism, supra note 202, at 396. 
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[D]espite the constitutionalization of defamation and privacy law 
begun with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, many common law 
rules of libel and slander, which were quite directly concerned with 
content, remained intact. . . . And this is to say nothing of the well-
known examples of fraud, perjury, and professional malpractice, 
which have never been considered “speech” for purposes of the 
first amendment.244 
In this respect, the ideal of content neutrality is like the proposition that 
it is possible for the courts to adopt an “absolutist” position on the First 
Amendment and protect everything that is speech; this is simply not 
possible since it would potentially make vast swathes of ordinary contract 
law unconstitutional.245 
But even as he uses a content-neutrality test that is particularly 
solicitous of speakers’ freedom, Justice Kennedy nevertheless continues to 
justify protection for commercial speech as protecting listeners’ interests. 
Content-based restrictions cannot be upheld, he writes, on the grounds that 
people might make bad decisions with that information.246 “‘The First 
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to 
keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own 
good.’”247 
But the listener benefit, Kennedy proposes, is one that is anchored 
more in theory than in the facts of the case. Doctors lobbied for this law. To 
be sure, some doctors find detailing visits from reps who know their 
prescriptions practices to be helpful,248 but the Vermont law permitted 
physicians who felt this way to opt into information sharing. It did not in 
any way prevent those doctors from having the benefit of this 
“information” while it permitted those who objected to the practice to 
prohibit the sale of their private information. To those physicians who 
might protest that they did not want to receive this information and, in fact, 
wanted to marshal the power of the state to protect them from having their 
private information used against them in ways they believed might 
compromise their professional judgment, Justice Kennedy responded as 
 
244. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
245. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First 
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 270–71 (1981). 
246. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–71 (2011) (quoting Thompson v. W. States 
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)). 
247. Id. at 2671 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)). 
248. See Silverman, The Death of the Sales Rep, supra note 21, describing a survey that found that 
a majority of doctors find visits from drug reps “very” or “somewhat” helpful. It is not clear however 
whether survey respondents meant to include access to the doctor’s prescribing information as part of 
what they found made the reps visits helpful. 
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follows: “Many are those who must endure speech they do not like, but that 
is a necessary cost of freedom.”249 
This is rather grand language to use about protecting the ability of 
pharmaceutical representatives to engage in the “hard sell.” Nothing in the 
original Virginia Pharmacy opinion suggested that the Court intended to 
expand the First Amendment so dramatically. In fact, the Court has 
repeatedly ignored invitations in cases like Nike, Inc. v. Kasky250 to abolish 
commercial speech’s “subordinate” position—and with good reason. It is 
difficult to say how many laws would be implicated by such a radical 
recalibrating of the balance between the First Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause. 
What is most at risk is the government’s ability to regulate fraud251 
because the strict scrutiny standard of review is often said to be “‘strict’ in 
theory and fatal in fact.”252 The Nike case illustrates this difficulty. It 
involved a lawsuit against Nike brought by a consumer activist, Kasky, 
who claimed that many of the public statements Nike made about its labor 
practices were false and alleged that these false statements constituted a 
violation of California’s false advertising and unfair trade practices laws, 
fraud, and deceit.253 Nike filed a demurrer (motion to dismiss) arguing that 
all of the statements were made in forums that were traditionally 
considered protected by the First Amendment, such as letters to the editor 
or issue ads.254 The lower courts agreed, but the California Supreme Court 
disagreed, finding that at least some of Nike’s speech might be considered 
commercial speech and thus, only protected if it were truthful.255 Nike 
appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court arguing that the standard that 
should apply was the strict scrutiny standard of New York Times v. 
Sullivan.256 The Court heard argument but ultimately dismissed the case on 
the grounds that certiorari had been improvidently granted.257 Yet, the 
concurring and dissenting opinions to the dismissal suggested that there 
was some sympathy on the Court to Nike’s argument.258 But would we 
really want New York Times v. Sullivan’s “breathing room” for false 
 
249. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2669 (emphasis added). 
250. 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
251. For a more full treatment of this issue see Tamara R. Piety, Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s 
Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 151 (2005). 
252. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). 
253. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002). 
254. Id. at 302. 
255. Id. at 262. 
256. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 659–60 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
257. Id. at 655 (per curiam). 
258. Id. at 656–84 (Stevens, J., concurring; Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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statements to be the standard against which we measure claims of 
commercial fraud? 
Strict scrutiny may not justify a motion to dismiss, but it will often 
support a motion for summary judgment. And although recent research 
suggests that the “fatal in fact” aphorism is somewhat exaggerated,259 it is 
still the case that strict scrutiny review would be distinctly more fatal to the 
regulation of commercial speech than the rational basis review that 
normally is applied to the regulation of commerce. “Although Gunther’s 
famous adage arose in the context of equal protection, strict scrutiny is 
actually most fatal in the area of free speech, where the survival rate is 22 
percent, lower than in any other right.”260 
This feature of strict scrutiny ought to be a matter of grave concern. 
Much of the work of the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and countless other governmental agencies is 
predicated on the government’s ability to pursue and punish not only fraud, 
but also statements which may be misleading or on the government’s 
ability to require various disclosures in order to conduct certain businesses. 
After Sorrell, many of these laws will be challenged. 
But the agency most clearly in the crosshairs of industry assault is the 
Food and Drug Administration. The Food and Drug Administration 
prohibits pharmaceutical sales reps from marketing drugs that have been 
approved by the agency for use for one purpose in another unapproved, 
“off-label” use.261 Numerous drug companies have paid millions, if not 
billions, of dollars in fines for off-label use marketing violations.262 
Predictably, they have argued the First Amendment protects their right to 
promote these drugs for a purpose for which they have not been 
prescribed.263 After Sorrell, the off-label use marketing prohibition may be 
endangered. 
 
259. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 869 (2006). 
260. Id. at 844 (emphasis added). It is also important to note that while Winkler broke down the 
category of the First Amendment into several separate categories, commercial speech was not one of 
them. Moreover, given the subsequent decisions of the Court, in Citizens United and Sorrell in 
particular, it is unclear how predictive this analysis would be for future cases. Although it is 
theoretically possible that the Court’s expansive grant of protection to commercial speech will inspire 
courts to interpret it in a manner that preserves more of the status quo, I am not terribly sanguine about 
that prospect. 
261. 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a) (West 2012). For a discussion of one of the recent cases, see Natasha 
Singer, Maker of Botox Settles Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010 at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/02/business/02allergan.html. 
262. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009 
at B4, available at http://nytimes.com/2009/09/03/business/03health.html. 
263. See, e.g., Editorial, FDA’s Off-Label Rule Under Attack, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/07/opinion/la-ed-drugs-20111107 (“[S]ome drug makers are 
pushing back in court, arguing that the FDA’s marketing limits violate their 1st Amendment rights.”). 
PIETY 1 - 54 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012 11:27 AM 
52 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 64:1:1 
 
The potential harms arising from the aggressive promotion of new 
drugs that have not been thoroughly tested should be apparent from the 
Vioxx debacle, in which thousands of people died from adverse cardiac 
impacts of the drug.264 In fact, the issues with Vioxx only fully emerged 
after the drug had been approved through what are known as “seeding 
trials.” Seeding trials are designed to look like clinical studies, but they are, 
in fact, orchestrated by the marketing department, not the research arm of 
the company.265 They are intended to get key doctors, those identified as 
“opinion leaders,” to prescribe the drug and recommend it to others.266 In 
addition, in some cases academics have allowed their names to be used on 
articles ghostwritten by drug company employees and have not disclosed 
this fact.267 Sorrell implicates the FDA’s ability to regulate that practice.  
Yet another example is the FDA’s recent rules regulating cigarette 
packaging. They have already been successfully attacked on the grounds 
that the regulations violate the tobacco companies’ freedom of 
expression.268 And these are just two examples in one area of regulatory 
authority—the FDA.269 What of the FTC? The SEC? The EPA? 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer asserted that the majority’s reasoning in 
Sorrell “reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial 
for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation is at 
issue.”270 How Lochner-esque Sorrell is as a matter of doctrine I leave to 
 
Not surprisingly there are several law review articles which urge that the prohibition on off-label use 
marketing is unconstitutional. See Lora E. Barnhart Driscolla, Citizens United v. Central Hudson: A 
Rationale for Simplifying and Clarifying the First Amendment’s Protection for Nonpolitical 
Advertisements, 19 GEO. MASON L REV. 213 (2011); Kristie LaSalle, A Prescription for Change: 
Citizens United’s Implications for Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Prescription Pharmaceuticals, 
19 J. L. & POL’Y 867 (2011); John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective on 
Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 299 
(2010). 
264. See, e.g., ANGELL, supra note 59, at 265–78 (describing the Vioxx and COX-2 inhibitors 
scandal); Jost, supra note 21, at 344. 
265. Kevin Hill, MD, MHS; Joseph S. Ross, MD, MHS; David S. Egilman, MD, MPH; and Harlan 
M. Krumholz, MS, SM, The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: A Review of Internal Documents, 149 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 251 (2008). 
266. Id. 
267. Joseph S. Ross, MD, MHS; Kevin P. Hill, MD, MPH; David S. Egilman, MD, MPH; Harlan 
M. Krumholz, MD, SM, Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to Rofecoxib, 299 
JAMA 1800 (2008). 
268. R.J. Reynolds v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated, 
Nos. 11–5332, 12–5063, 2012 WL 3632003 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 24, 2012) (reviewing the law under what 
looks like strict scrutiny, despite nominally applying Central Hudson, and finding it unconstitutional). 
See also Commonwealth Brands v. U.S., 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky 2010) (declining to apply strict 
scrutiny but nevertheless finding portions of the law unconstitutional). 
269. For more examples, see David S. Egilman & Susanna Rankin Bohme, Over a Barrel: 
Corporate Corruption of Science and Its Effects on Workers and the Environment, 11 INT. J. OCCUP. 
ENVTL. HEALTH 331 (2005); Christopher T. Robertson, The Money Blind: How to Stop Industry Bias in 
Biomedical Science, Without Violating the First Amendment, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 358 (2011). 
270. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
PIETY 1 - 54 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/19/2012 11:27 AM 
2012] “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? 53 
 
others,271 but it is obviously substantially more difficult to regulate 
commerce if you cannot regulate commercial speech. Apparently as a retort 
to Justice Breyer’s observation, Justice Kennedy invoked Justice Holmes’ 
famous Lochner dissent and observed that while the Constitution “‘does 
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics’ . . . [i]t does enact the First 
Amendment.”272 
The irony here, of course, is that the Constitution also enacts the 
Commerce Clause. And the justification originally offered for giving any 
First Amendment protection to commercial speech was the protection of a 
“free enterprise economy,” an observation which prompted Justice 
Rehnquist to protest that the Constitution also did not enact the philosophy 
of Adam Smith.273 Justice Kennedy apparently believes that it did under the 
guise of the First Amendment. It would be difficult to conceive of a clearer 
declaration of supremacy in the struggle between the First Amendment and 
the Commerce Clause. Yet, it seems unlikely that the First Amendment was 
intended to undo the Commerce Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
For now, we know how this story ends. By the year 2010, the 
commercial speech doctrine had evolved into a test that was strict scrutiny 
in all but name, although the Court continued to recognize a distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial speech. Then came Citizens 
United, and its muscular version of corporate personhood. Given the 
interpenetration of the commercial and corporate political speech doctrines, 
it seemed only a matter of time before the Court imported that very robust, 
speaker-centric vision into the commercial speech doctrine. It only took a 
year. 
Yet Sorrell is in many ways, if not a more dangerous opinion for 
democracy than Citizens United, at least an equally dangerous one. In 
Sorrell, the Court took a doctrine that was conceived of as a species of 
consumer protection, and justified as furthering the public interest, and 
 
271. The correct constitutional interpretation of Lochner is beyond the scope of this piece. Suffice 
it to say that Breyer’s use of Lochner suggests he believes it is presumptively illegitimate or, as Balkin 
might say, part of the “anti-canon” in constitutional law. See Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided,” 
supra note 17. That Justice Kennedy’s opinion doesn’t really challenge that claim to anti-canonical 
status but rather offers something like a “so what?” could be argued as evidence of Balkin’s theory that 
Lochner’s status as anti-canon is sufficiently in dispute that Kennedy feels free to disregard it. On the 
other hand, one could read his failure to defend Lochner more forcefully (along the revisionist line 
Balkin discusses) as confirmation of its continued anti-canonical status. 
272. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). 
273. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 784 (1975) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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turned it into a weapon against Vermont’s effort to protect consumers and 
the public health, safety, and welfare. It took a doctrine that was supposed 
to give the listeners more autonomy and freedom to make their own 
decisions and used it to deny those listeners control over their own 
information. And because it did all this without explicitly overruling 
Central Hudson or acknowledging that it was announcing a new standard 
by which to evaluate commercial speech, the Court rendered the 
commercial speech doctrine incoherent and sowed further confusion about 
what the appropriate test is. Armed with this new (and inherently 
contradictory) “content-neutrality” inquiry, the Supreme Court is in a 
position to pick and choose and selectively invalidate those parts of the 
regulation of commerce brought to it with which its majority disagrees. 
It is too soon to say what the Court will do with these new powers that 
it has appropriated for itself to subject economic regulation to substantive 
rather than deferential review. But, it seems safe to say that if these last two 
Terms offer any hints, its exercise of this review power is not likely to be 
“conservative” in the traditional sense. 
The rhetoric of content neutrality and equal rights for corporate 
speakers obscures that the entities and interests being protected here are 
some of the world’s most powerful institutions, institutions with enormous, 
some would say excessive, influence in the legislative process to obtain 
favorable laws. They do not need to marshal the counter-majoritarian 
power of the courts to preserve their rights against an oppressive minority 
in the electorate. Nor are they human beings with inherent political rights. 
Rather, they are creatures of law meant to serve the public interest, not to 
dominate it. To argue that selling toothpaste is of the same significance as 
political protest and to put commercial speakers on par with those engaging 
in lunch counter sit-ins is to trivialize the whole notion of civil rights. The 
Commerce Clause arguably points to the legitimacy of subordinating 
commercial expression to other sorts of expression. False or misleading 
commercial speech can pose grave dangers to the public and distort proper 
market function. Not only is it not a “necessary cost of freedom” to offer 
full First Amendment protection to commercial speech, it may be a 
necessary cost of freedom to keep it in check. 
 
